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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following situation. An investment banker em-
bezzles millions of dollars from a bank in Italy and transfers the
funds to an account in the United States. While he is vacationing in
[Vol. 49:12391240
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the United States, federal marshals apprehend him pursuant to a
request by the Italian government. They bring him before a federal
district court judge sitting as an extradition magistrate in the local
federal courthouse. After determining that the evidence presented
meets the requisite level of criminality, the judge declares that the
banker is properly extraditable and binds the case over to the Secre-
tary of State.
The President, however, wishes to express his displeasure with
Italy's failure to lend assistance during a recent military maneuver.
He sends a memo to the State Department indicating that the banker
should not be surrendered to Italy. So as not to embarrass high-
ranking officials of the Italian government, the Secretary of State
issues a statement specifying that the extradition magistrate incor-
rectly concluded that sufficient evidence of criminality existed.
From the perspective of the hypothetical banker and other
individuals accused of committing crimes in foreign jurisdictions, the
prospect of this type of executive reprieve would seem a welcome
possibility., Recently, though, one individual awaiting extradition 2
from the United States successfully argued in federal district court
that the possibility of such review violated accepted principles of
separation of powers. 3 Specifically, he argued that the statute gov-
erning extradition afforded members of the executive branch the
opportunity to review and revise decisions of federal judges sitting as
extradition magistrates. While this position has not been adopted in
other jurisdictions, 4 it has created uncertainty in current extradition
1. Although the Secretary of State may decline to surrender the individual once the
individual has been found extraditable by the extradition magistrate, the Secretary may not
surrender an individual if the magistrate determines that sufficient evidence does not exist to
warrant extradition. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184 et seq. 1994 ed. In other words, the prospect of review
by the Secretary of State can only inure to the benefit of the accused. One court has found this
to be a relevant factor in denying the potential extraditee standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute. See Matter of Extradition of Lang, 905 F. Supp. 1385, 1392
(C.D. Cal. 1995).
2. "Extradition is the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a crime
under the law of one state is arrested in another state and returned for trial or punishment."
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 474 at 556-57 (1987).
3. Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995). The D.C. Circuit vacated and re-
manded Judge Lamberth's controversial decision mandating dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Lobue v. Christopher, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The circuit court, therefore, did not reach
the issue of whether the procedure governing extradition violated separation of powers.
4. Each federal court that has subsequently considered the issue has disagreed with the
conclusion reached in Lobue. See, for example, LoDuca v. United States, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
22208 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 1996); Werner v. Hickey, 920 F. Supp. 1257 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Matter of
Extradition of Lin, 915 F. Supp. 206 (D. Guam 1995); Matter of Extradition of Lang, 905 F.
Supp. 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Matter of Extradition of Sutton, 905 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Mo. 1995);
Cherry v. Warden, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14828 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1995); Matter of Extradition of
Sidali, 899 F. Supp. 1342 (D.N.J. 1995); Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
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proceedings and has affected the negotiation of several extradition
treaties.5 Moreover, in light of the fact that the statute is nearly one
hundred fifty years old, a finding of unconstitutionality was novel and
unexpected.6 Because the opinion declaring the extradition procedure
unconstitutional was later vacated at the appellate level for lack of
jurisdiction,7 the appellate court did not reach the issue of whether
the procedure violated separation of powers, essentially leaving this
an open issue for subsequent consideration. This Note will endeavor
to undertake such a consideration.
The ultimate lack of an analytical coherence in the Supreme
Court's treatment of separation of powers issues unfortunately makes
it difficult to predict the outcome of any given case.8 While each of the
5. The impact of Judge Lamberth's ruling was immediately felt by the State Department,
as the extradition of a notorious criminal to Peru was temporarily delayed by a federal court in
Florida. Toni Locy, Judge Prohibits Extraditions by U.S.; State Department Voices Concern
About Impact on Foreign Policy, Wash. Post A9 (Sept. 16, 1995) ('It is unclear how many other
fugitives could be affected by [Judge] Lamberth's order."); Editorial, Separate Nations, Separate
Powers, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 14B (Sept. 16, 1995) CThough the decision is immediately
binding only on [those involved in the case before Judge Lamberth], it threw into question
extradition proceedings involving about 250 people wanted on criminal charges in other
countries."). See also Op-Ed, Extradition, Wash. Post A18 (Sept. 23, 1995) C'Government law-
yers should be preparing an amendment to the extradition statute for congressional
consideration .... If Judge Lamberth's ruling is upheld, a bill should be ready for the Hill.").
The practical implications of the ruling extended well beyond the actual surrender of indi-
viduals to foreign countries to stand trial. Government officials indicated that foreign policy
decisions and the negotiations of several extradition treaties were adversely affected. Thomas
W. Lippman, Judge's Bar on Extradition Draws Officials' Complaints; Cases, Treaty Talks
Disrupted While U.S. Appeals, Washington Post at A2 (Sept. 21, 1995). The problems caused by
this decision were compounded when Judge Lamberth expanded his original ruling and barred
the government from sending any suspects to another country to stand trial. Locy, Wash. Post
at A9 (cited in this note). However, the expansion of the original ruling was expeditiously
overturned by the D.C. Circuit Court. Toni Locy, Court Suspends Ruling Barring U.S.
Extradition; Statute to Remain in Force During Appeal, Wash. Post A3 (Sept. 30, 1995).
6. Toni Locy, Law Permitting Citizens to Be Extradited for Foreign Trials Is Struck
Down, Wash. Post A14 (Sept. 1, 1995) ("A federal judge yesterday struck down the U.S.
extradition law that, for more than 150 years, has allowed Americans accused of committing
crimes abroad to be sent to foreign countries to face punishment.... Justice Department
lawyers had argued the extradition law had withstood the test of time and should remain
intact."). Judge Lamberth responded to appeals to defer to the constitutionality of the law due
to its longevity: "It is certainly unfortunate that this fundamental flaw (in the law) has gone
unnoticed for so long; however, the court will not further compound this error by a turning a
blind eye to the statute now." George Graham, Extradition Rules in Doubt, Financial Times 3
(Sept. 1, 1995) (quoting Judge Lamberth).
7. In vacating Judge Lamberth's opinion, the D.C. Circuit Court explained that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Lobue, 82 F.3d at 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The
court indicated that general declaratory relief could not be used to challenge a federal law, due
to its displacement by specific habeas corpus relief. Id.
8. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1513, 1517 (1991) ("[The Supreme Courts treatment of the constitutional separation of powers
is an incoherent muddle."); Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: 77, E, olution and
Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 719, 722-43
(indicating that the Court has failed to establish a coherent analytical approach in the area of
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differing philosophies on how such issues should be treated has some
degree of merit-from formalism, with its pristine and textualist per-
ception of the Constitution, to functionalism, with its pragmatic flexi-
bility-selection of one method of analysis over another has the poten-
tial to render a markedly different result s This is not the case,
however, when the constitutionality of United States extradition
procedure is assessed. Current United States extradition procedure
cannot survive constitutional scrutiny under either a formalist or a
functionalist analysis.
The internal procedure culminating in the extradition of an
individual from the United States to a foreign nation is an intriguing
system characterized by vague delineations of power among the three
branches of the federal government. 10 The statute governing extra-
dition creates constitutional problems of executive review and extraju-
dicial service by requiring members of the judicial branch to render
non-binding, reviewable determinations of extraditability while sit-
ting as extradition magistrates." These problems have been created
by the ambiguous wording of the statute, and more dramatically by
the manner in which the statute has been interpreted. Examining the
constitutionality of the statute requires more than the interpretation
of a few words and a characterization of the roles played by the exec-
utive and the judiciary. It necessitates an analysis of why both the
executive and the judiciary are involved and an assessment of how the
performance of their assigned duties impacts their status as separate
branches of the federal government. Such an evaluation
demonstrates that as it now stands, federal extradition procedure
violates the principle of separation of powers.
Part II of this Note briefly sets forth the competing positions
courts have adopted in undertaking constitutional scrutiny of the
separation of powers); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of
Powers-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 526 (1987) (commenting that the
Supreme Court's disparate treatment of separation of powers issues demonstrates inconsistent
reasoning).
9. Formalism and functionalism are terms which scholars have adopted in describing the
Supreme Court's treatment of separation of powers issues. While any particular Justice would
be reluctant to cast himself or herself as a formalist or functionalist, opinions by the Court in
separation of powers cases usually fit within one of these particular characterizations. For
further discussion of the formalist and functionalist approaches, see Parts IV.A. and IV.B.
10. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184 et seq. (1994 ed.) (governing the procedure for extradition of an
individual from the United States).
11. 'Extradition magistrate" is a descriptive term encompassing those judges who have
been authorized to conduct extradition proceedings. These judges include members of the
federal judiciary (Article III judges), federal magistrate judges under the supervision of a federal
court, and state court judges. Id. § 3184. For purposes of this Note, discussion is confined to
members of the federal judiciary unless otherwise indicated.
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current extradition statute. Part III examines the roles played by the
executive and the judiciary in the extradition process. Part IV sub-
jects the procedure to the traditional formal and functional tests
employed by the Supreme Court when dealing with separation of
powers issues and culminates in an analysis of the inherent strengths
and weakness of each test. This Note ultimately concludes that the
extradition procedure cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny and
briefly describes two potential solutions.
II. CURRENT EXTRADITION LITIGATION: PROBLEMS AND POSITIONS
Article III judges serve on federal courts with life tenure and
salary protections. The federal extradition statute vests these judges
with the authority to sit as extradition magistrates and to determine
issues of extraditability upon request from a foreign nation. 12 If an
individual is found to be properly extraditable, the magistrate certi-
fies this determination to the Secretary of State, who ultimately de-
cides whether to surrender the individual to the requesting state. 13
The decision rendered by the Secretary of State has become the cor-
nerstone of constitutional challenges to this process as it is perceived
as an impermissible review of a judicial determination by the execu-
tive.
12. The statute provides, in relevant part:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and
any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate
authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of record of
general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath, charging any
person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of
any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or con-
vention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be
brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of
criminality may be heard and considered.
Id.
13. The statute further indicates:
If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the
provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a
copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may
issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the
surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and
he shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper
jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made.
1244 [Vol. 49:1239
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A. The Impetus for a Constitutional Examination:
Lobue v. Christopher
1. The Facts of the Case
Pursuant to the extradition treaty in place between the United
States and Canada, Canadian officials requested the extradition of
individuals allegedly involved in a kidnapping incident. 14  The
Secretary of State properly forwarded this request to the United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, the jurisdiction in
which officials believed the kidnappers resided, and extradition
proceedings commenced.' 5 After the required extradition hearing, the
extradition magistrate determined that the individuals involved in
the alleged kidnapping were properly extraditable.' 6  The District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois then granted a stay of the
order of surrender to allow for the filing of a habeas corpus petition.17
Despite this order, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot signed the
surrender warrant authorizing the extradition to Canada. 8 The indi-
viduals slated for surrender to Canada filed an action in the District
Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment and
injunction challenging the constitutionality of the extradition
statute.9
14. In December 1987, Anthony DeSilva and his wife, Tammy, were involved in an
automobile accident leaving Ms. DeSilva paralyzed and mentally disabled. As a consequence of
Mr. DeSilva's filing of a personal injury lawsuit in Illinois, his wife, who at the time was being
cared for by her mother in Canada, was required to undergo a medical examination as part of
discovery in the case. Mr. DeSilva and other co-workers from the Chicago area traveled into
Canada with the intention of bringing Ms. DeSilva back to the United States. Upon attempting
to re-cross the border, Mr. DeSilva was stopped by United States Claims officers, who had been
notified by the Winnipeg police that he had illegally abducted his wife. While Mr. DeSilva and
the other men were allowed to return to the United States, Ms. DeSilva remained in Canada
and subsequently requested that the individuals, including her husband, be charged with a
criminal offense. Matter of Extradition of Kulekowskis, 881 F. Supp. 1126, 1129-35 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1149. A determination of extraditability usually requires the following
determinations: (1) that the offense charged is included in the extradition treaty as an
extraditable offense; (2) that the alleged offense is considered criminal in both the requesting
state and the United States; and (3) that a certain level of evidence exists indicating that the
accused committed the crime. See Part III.A.2.
17. Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 67.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 65.
1246 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 49:1239
2. The District Court's Consideration of the Issue and Holding
The accused individuals (now plaintiffs) argued that the cur-
rent extradition statute created a scheme granting the executive
branch power to review and revise determinations of extraditability
made by Article III judges sitting as extradition magistrates. 20 The
government responded by defining the process of extradition as en-
compassing two distinct functions-first, the judicial determination of
extraditability and second, the executive decision to extradite.2' In
the end, the court adopted the plaintiffs' assessment of the extradition
procedure. 22
The court defined the issue in this case as whether a statute
may confer upon the executive, in the person of the Secretary of State,
the authority to review determinations of extradition magistrates.
23
The court determined that the discretion exercised by the Secretary of
State did, indeed, result in an executive review of a judicial finding.24
Rejecting the government's plea for the court to rely on the more flex-
ible functional approach to separation of powers adopted by the
20. See Plaintiffs Surreply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4, Lobue v. Christopher,
836 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995) (on file with the Author). Plaintiffs argued that this violated
separation of powers because the extradition magistrate's determination was essentially an
advisory opinion. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that the decisions of Article III
judge may not be revised by members of either the executive or legislative branches. See Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1453, 131 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1995) ("Congress cannot vest
review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch."). Nor may
Article III judges issue opinions which do not bind the parties involved in the case or contro-
versy before the court. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
21. The Government indicated:
Contrary to plaintiffs view, the Secretary of State does not "revise[], overturn[], or re-
fuse[ ] faith and credit" to the extradition judge's determination. The extradition judge's
certification is not that the extradition must occur, but simply that it is lawful to hold
and extradite the fugitive under the extradition treaty. As argued previously, this is
functionally the same as the determination that it is lawful to conduct a search, arrest a
person, or hold him to answer certain criminal charges. The ultimate decision whether
to carry out an extradition is, however, a political and foreign policy determination
committed to the executive branch. Consequently, it would be beyond any judicial
officer's power to compel the Secretary of State, by virtue of the certification of
extraditability, to exercise his discretion in favor of extradition.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 25, Lobue v. Christopher, 836 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995) (on
file with the Author).
However, the government's opinion neglects historical evidence demonstrating that the
Secretary of State has reviewed and reversed the legal determinations of extradition magis-
trates in deciding whether to surrender accused individuals to requesting nations. See Part
III.B.3.
22. Lobue, 893 F.Supp at 78.
23. Id. at 68.
24. Id. at 68-70.
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Supreme Court in cases such as Mistretta v. United States2 5 and
United States v. Nixon,26 the court determined that the statute at
issue could not withstand separation of powers scrutiny. 7 The court
recognized that the judge's determinations were neither final nor
binding on the executive and concluded that the extradition statute
contravened the intended reach of the constitutional power vested in
the executive. 28 The court interpreted the certification of the extradi-
tion magistrate as the final word of the judiciary on the question of
extraditability and as such, "[s]ubjecting the final determinations of
the Judiciary to Executive Branch review in this manner [was per-
ceived to be] manifestly unconstitutional."2 9
B. Post-Lobue Consideration of the Process of Extradition
Not suprisingly, numerous individuals facing the prospect of
extradition from the United States have invoked the holding in Lobue
as a constitutional bar to their extradition.30 Unfortunately for these
individuals, the judiciary has generally turned a deaf ear to these
arguments. 31 These subsequent decisions do not reflect a rejection of
the basic principle relied on in Lobue, namely that executive review of
judicial decisions is unconstitutional. Rather, these cases reflect a
different interpretation of the roles played by the respective branches
in the process of extradition.
25. 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (examining the separation of powers issues and judicial
participation in the Federal Sentencing Commission). The government relied on supreme court
holdings evincing a willingness to permit the intermingling of the three branches of the general
government so long as the authority and independence of each branch is effectively preserved.
Moreover, the government put forth the contention that the Framers never intended to create
three hermetically sealed branches of government, each completely separate from the others.
26. 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (indicating that the three branches of government have never
been required to "operate with absolute independence"). The government also alluded to the
Court's holdings in both Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in asserting the principle that the Constitution did not
contemplate absolute and total separation of powers. Government's Reply at 19.
27. Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 78.
28. Id. at 71.
29. Id. at 75.
30. In several cases, individuals facing extradition argued that the procedure violated
separation of powers. See Werner v. Hickey, 920 F. Supp. 1257 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Matter of
Extradition of Lin, 915 F. Supp. 206 (D. Guam 1995); Matter of Extradition of Lang, 905 F.
Supp. 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Matter of Extradition of Sutton, 905 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Mo. 1995);
Cherry, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14828 at *1 Matter of Extradition of Sidali, 899 F. Supp. 1342
(D.N.J. 1995); Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
31. Each court cited in note 30 determined that the extradition statute was constitutional.
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Many district courts have relied heavily on principles of statu-
tory interpretation in reaching their conclusions. 32 In most cases,
courts have focused on a "plain reading" of the extradition statute and
have found that the statute on its face does not confer an
impermissible review power on the Secretary of State.33
Other courts have found the statute constitutional in light of
the differing roles performed by the respective branches in the extra-
dition process. 34 This interpretation defines the role of the extradition
magistrate as reaching a final, non-reviewable conclusion on the
threshold issue of whether extradition would be lawful. The
extradition hearing is compared to a preliminary criminal hearing,35
and the decision to extradite is viewed as one of many factors
considered by the executive in ultimately reaching a foreign policy
conclusion. 36 Although courts considering this issue have selected a
32. See Lang, 905 F. Supp. at 1391; Sutton, 905 F. Supp. at 635; Carreno, 899 F. Supp. at
629-30.
33. See Lang, 905 F. Supp. at 1391 ('The court is not convinced that the extradition
statute creates executive revision."); Sutton, 905 F. Supp. at 635 C'This court finds the plain
language of the statute does not confer an impermissible power of review upon the Secretary");
Carreno, 899 F. Supp. at 630 ("Therefore, the court finds no support in the language of the
statute itself for the proposition that the statute confers an impermissible power of review upon
the Secretary of State.").
Although concentrating on a plain reading of the statute reveals no apparent constitutional
problems, the manner in which courts have interpreted the language of the statute clearly
implicates separation of powers concerns not readily apparent from the statute's text. See Parts
III.A.3. and III.B.3. Thus, the unconstitutionality of the statute is derived from the language of
the statute indirectly, in that the ambiguity of the statute has afforded its interpreters the
opportunity to convey impermissible power upon members of the executive and judicial
branches of the federal government. For the language of the statute at issue, see notes 12 and
13.
Quite separate from the statutory interpretation relied on in the cases above, was the
unique approach adopted by a California district court's opinion in Lang. Although this court
did indicate that it would reject a separation of powers argument in the case on plain reading
grounds, the court also noted that the petitioner did not have standing to raise the issue due to
the fact that the review by the executive could only inure to the benefit of the accused. Lang,
905 F. Supp. at 1391-99.
34. See Cherry, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14828 at *7 (performing an analysis of the roles of
the extradition magistrate and executive and indicating "the fact that the testimony at
extradition hearings is reviewed by a member of the executive branch is not violative of the
separation of powers doctrine"); Sidali, 899 F. Supp. at 1350.
35. The comparison of an extradition hearing to a preliminary criminal hearing does have
the support of some appellate courts. See, for example, Word v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 288
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (indicating that "an extradition hearing ... is akin to a preliminary
examination"); United States v. Kember, 685 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
36. In Cherry, the court indicated as follows:
An extradition hearing is a preliminary hearing conducted to honor the treaty
obligations of the United States negotiated and ratified by the executive and legislative
branches. It is not an adjudication of guilt or innocence. In an extradition hearing the
magistrate judge decides whether extradition would be lawful. He or she is not making
a final determination that extradition should or should not be carried out, a
determination which may involve foreign policy considerations. Therefore, the fact that
EXTRADITION PROCEDURE
relatively straightforward approach, they have chosen to ignore
substantial historical evidence of executive review and revision of
extraditability determinations made by federal judges sitting as
extradition magistrates. 3 7
Irrespective of which viewpoint is adopted, extradition requires
complicated interaction among the three branches of the federal gov-
ernment before an individual is surrendered to the requesting state.
Accurately characterizing the functions that each branch performs is
therefore an essential prerequisite to a separation of powers analysis.
III. EXTRADITION PROCEDURE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Throughout its history, the United States has entered into
numerous extradition treaties.3 8 In the absence of express enabling
legislation, the executive was initially charged with ensuring that
these international obligations were fulfilled. Congress, however,
eventually curtailed executive dominance in this area by introducing
a judicial role in the process through the creation of the extradition
magistrate. For nearly 150 years, the extradition of individuals to
foreign countries from the United States has been governed by the
procedures codified in 18 U.S.C. section 3184. Legislative adoption of
these procedures was an effort to protect individual liberties by
guaranteeing judicial oversight of the extradition process. 39 Although
the extradition legislation enacted by Congress expressly defines the
roles of the executive and the judiciary, courts and commentators
the testimony at extradition hearings is reviewed by a member of the executive branch
is not violative of the separation of powers doctrine.
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14828 at *7. See also Sidali, 899 F. Supp. at 1350 ('In passing, the court
simply notes its belief that the function of the Secretary of State is not to 'review' a judicial
decision but rather is something wholly different. The executive decision is much more
expansive than the judicial decision. The Executive Branch must consider a wider variety of
factors in determining whether to actually extradite an individual once a certificate of
extraditability has been issued.").
37. See Part II.B.3 for a description of incidents of executive review and revision
throughout history.
38. In 1794, for example, the United States entered into the Treaty of Amity, Commerce,
and Navigation with Great Britain. This treaty provided for the extradition of individuals
charged with murder or forgery and marked the first American treaty provision expressly
dealing with the subject of extradition. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Art. 27, 8
Stat. 116, Treaty Ser. No. 105 (1794), reprinted in Hunter Miller, ed., 2 Treaties and Other
International Acts of the United States of America 263 (U.S. G.P.O., 1931)) ("Jay Treaty"). Since
this time, the United States has entered into treaties or has been a member to conventions
providing for extradition with nearly every nation in the world.
39. See Matter of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1981) (The prime purpose of the
1848 statute... was to provide additional judicial officers to handle extradition requests.").
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have interpreted this legislation in a manner not readily apparent
from the text of the statute and contradictory to the principle of
separation of powers.40
A. The Judicial Process
1. Judicial Involvement: Origins and Rationale
Extradition procedure within the United States originally
failed to contemplate a distinct role for the judiciary. This absence of
judicial involvement was apparent in the very first case involving the
extradition of an individual from the United States. The lack of
judicial input resulted in criticism sufficient to cause the defeat of an
incumbent in a presidential election and essentially to cripple
American extradition procedure for nearly fifty years. The first
reported extradition case, United States v. Robbins,41 involved the
United States' surrender to Great Britain of an individual accused of
participating in a mutiny aboard a British vessel. United States
extradition law at the time consisted of the international obligation to
extradite pursuant to the Jay Treaty and the Supremacy Clause 42
which rendered this treaty the law of the land. Federal courts had no
constitutional or legislative jurisdiction over extradition,
demonstrating a complete lack of a domestic extradition framework. 43
Nevertheless, the Secretary of State, acting on behalf of President
John Adams, advised and requested that a federal district judge in
South Carolina surrender Robbins to the British.4  The district court
relied on this executive request in concluding that Robbins would be
properly extraditable, though neither the treaty with Great Britain
nor any legislation at the time formed a legal basis for the President's
action.45
40. See notes 12 and 13 for the text of the statute at issue. Though the statute at issue
neither expressly authorizes executive review of judicial determinations nor directs Article III
judges to serve in an extrajudicial capacity, interpretations of the statute have allowed such
practices to occur.
41. 27 F. Cases 825 (No. 16,175) (D.S.C. 1799).
42. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (indicating that treaties made under the authority of the
United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
43. Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 Yale L. J.
229, 288 (1990).
44. Robbins, 27 F. Cases at 826-27.
45. Id. at 827. Upon Judge Bee's determination, "the irons were placed on the prisoner"
and he was surrendered to British officials. He was hanged not long after this surrender.
Wedgwood, 100 Yale L. J. at 287-99 (cited in note 43).
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Against a backdrop of anti-English sentiment and disapproval
of the centralized strength of the British Crown, Thomas Jefferson
extensively criticized the manner in which President Adams handled
the extradition of Robbins, calling the President's action an infringe-
ment on the powers and independence of the judiciary.46 Moreover,
the remarkable thought of allowing the executive to pull an individual
off the street for surrender to a foreign nation without any judicial
function appeared highly dangerous to liberty.47 Robbins thus became
the impetus for the inclusion of an express role for the judiciary in
subsequent extradition treaties and legislation.48  Formal judicial
involvement was designed to prevent executive usurpation of judicial
authority and to provide for the protection of the liberty interests of
individuals faced with the prospect of extradition.49 Specifically, the
task of determining extraditability has been assigned to the courts by
legislation so as to protect fundamental individual rights and liberty. 50
46. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, 1 International Extradition: United States Law and Practice
ch. 2 at 48-49 (Oceana, 1987); Michael Abbell and Bruno A. Ristau, 4 International Judicial
Assistance § 13-1-1 at 3-4 (International Law Inst., 1990); Jaques Semmelman, Federal Courts,
the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76
Cornell L. Rev. 1198, 1206-07 (1991).
47. See Wedgwood, 100 Yale L. J. at 316 (cited in note 43). See also In re Kaine, 55 U.S.
103, 112 (1852) ("[E]xtradition without an unbiased hearing before an independent judiciary [is]
highly dangerous to liberty.").
48. The Supreme Court has recognized the inherent protection offered by an Article III
adjudication of cases and controversies and has stated: "The Framers of the Constitution had a
similar understanding of the judicial role, and as a consequence, they established that Article
III judges would be appointed, rather than elected, and would be sheltered from public opinion
by receiving life tenure and salary protection." Chisoin v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991).
Similar protections are non-existent when decisions are made by either the executive or
legislative branches.
49. Austin v. Healy, 5 F.3d 598, 604 (2nd Cir. 1993) ("[W]e agree that 'extradition without
an unbiased hearing before an independent judiciary is highly dangerous to liberty' ") (quoting
In re Kaine, 55 U.S. 103, 112 (1852)).
50. The provision governing extradition in the Jay Treaty lapsed in 1807, and the United
States was then without an extradition treaty with Great Britain or any other nation in the
world. Since the executive was not otherwise authorized to extradite an individual, the federal
government lacked the authority to extradite for thirty-five years. It was not until 1842, when
the United States entered into the Webster-Ashburn Treaty with Great Britain, that extradition
could properly resume pursuant to treaty. 8 Stat. 572, Treaty Ser. No. 119 (1842).
Due in large part to criticism of the Robbins case, the Webster-Ashburn Treaty specifically
created the first express role for the judiciary in the extradition process. Id. The role of the
judiciary was further formalized through the enactment of congressional legislation creating the
position of extradition magistrate, effectively vesting jurisdiction in federal judges, state judges,
and commissioners to hear extradition matters and certify individuals for extradition. Act of
Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, § 5, 9 Stat. 302, 303.
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2. Defining the Judicial Role
Congress has conferred authority on the judiciary to become
involved in the extradition procedure whenever a treaty or convention
is in place providing for extradition between the United States and
the requesting nation.51 Contingent upon the satisfaction of various
procedural requirements5 2 members of the federal judiciary sitting as
extradition magistrates are authorized to conduct extradition hear-
ings. The purpose of the extradition hearing is not to adjudicate guilt
or innocence, but to decide whether the accused can properly be certi-
fied as extraditable. 53  In assessing whether the threshold require-
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1994 ed.) (providing that the legislative delegation of authority to
the executive and judiciary "shall continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of
extradition" with the requesting state). See also Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker,
299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1936); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) ("[T]he general opinion
has been, and practice has been in accordance with it, that in the absence of a constitutional or
legislative provision, there is no authority vested in any part of the government to seize a
fugitive criminal and surrender him to a foreign power.") (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
52. Upon the filing of the formal request for extradition, the Department of State forwards
the necessary papers to the United States Attorney in the district where it is believed the
accused is residing so that a request can be made to the appropriate judicial officer for a
warrant authorizing the arrest of the accused. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The extradition magistrate is
then authorized to issue a warrant "upon complaint made under oath" so that the arrest of the
accused may be executed. Id. The complaint may be filed by any person acting with the
permission and authority of the foreign state seeking extradition and must fairly apprise the
accused of the alleged crime. In re Wise, 168 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D. Tex. 1957).
Once the extradition magistrate determines these requirements satisfied, a warrant may
issue for the arrest of the accused. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Apprehension of the accused by law
enforcement officials ultimately culminates in a determination by an extradition magistrate as
to whether the accused can be classified as extraditable. Id. Indigent accused persons may be
assigned counsel. See Abbell and Ristau, 4 International Judicial Assistance § 13-2-2 at 32-33
(cited in note 46). A pre-trial release determination is also made on apprehension, prior to the
actual extradition hearing. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903). Once these procedural
requirements have been adequately addressed, the process of determining the issue of extra-
ditability commences.
53. In Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (1888) the Court commented:
We are not sitting in this court on the trial of the prisoner, with power to pronounce him
guilty and punish him or declare him innocent and acquit him. We are now engaged
simply in an inquiry as to whether, under the construction of the act of Congress and
the treaty entered into ... there was legal evidence before the commissioner to justify
him in exercising his power to commit the person accused to custody to await the requi-
sition of the [foreign] government.
Id. at 462-63. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has specified that:
The accused is not entitled to introduce evidence which merely goes to his defense but
he may offer limited evidence to explain elements in the case against him, since the
extradition proceeding is not a trial of the guilt or innocence but of the character of a
preliminary examination held before a committing magistrate to determine whether the
accused shall be held liable for trial in another tribunal.
Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 556 (5th Cir. 1962). See also Glucksinan v. Henkel, 221
U.S. 508, 512 (1911) (characterizing the full contemplation of all evidence as a waste of time for
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ment of extraditability has been established, the extradition magis-
trate is customarily required to consult the applicable treaty provi-
sions and perform three inquiries: (1) whether the offense charged is
considered extraditable pursuant to the treaty with the requesting
state; (2) whether the offense satisfies the principle of dual criminal-
ity; and (3) whether there is probable cause that the accused commit-
ted the alleged crime.
The first requirement precludes the United States from
extraditing an individual to a foreign nation unless the treaty with
that nation specifies the alleged act as extraditable.54 An extradition
treaty may enumerate certain extraditable offenses and exclude
offenses not specifically listed. Alternatively, a treaty may adopt an
eliminative method, whereby a minimum threshold of punishment is
required before the crime will be considered an extraditable offense. 55
In the latter half of the twentieth century, courts added the
further requirement of dual criminality.56 Dual criminality requires
the alleged offense to be characterized as criminal under the laws of
both states involved in the extradition proceedings. 57 The principle of
dual criminality ensures that each state can rely on corresponding
treatment. Moreover, it ensures that no state will be forced to deliver
an individual for an action which it does not consider criminal.58 The
the extradition magistrate in reliance on the good faith attributed to the requesting government
that the accused will receive a fair trial).
54. See Abbell and Ristau, 4 International Judicial Assistance § 13-2-4 at 56 (cited in note
46). The primary rationale advanced for the definition of extraditable offenses is to avoid the
costly procedure of extradition for fairly minor offenses and to avoid having the requested state
decline to surrender the accused on the policy reason that the act is not considered criminal in
that state. Bassiouni, 1 International Extradition ch. 7 at 333 (cited in note 46).
55. Bassiouni, 1 International Extradition ch. 7 at 333-34 (cited in note 46). Bassiouni
offers two general methods for determining extraditable offenses. The first involves the formula
for ascertaining whether the offense is considered extraditable according to the treaty and the
second, relied on in the absence of a treaty, requires a reciprocal recognition of the offense as ex-
traditable by both the requesting and the requested state. Id. Because extradition from the
United States must occur pursuant to a treaty, the second option is not available for considera-
tion by the extradition magistrate. For a case involving the interpretation of treaty provisions
to determine whether the offense could be characterized as extraditable, see Melia v. United
States, 667 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1981).
56. See, for example, Wright, 190 U.S. at 58 ('The general principle of international law is
that in all cases of extradition the act done on account of which extradition is demanded must be
considered a crime by both parties.").
57. Most of the treaties pertaining to extradition prior to the 1970s do not contain this re-
quirement with respect to all offenses. Typically, such requirements were imposed on specific
offenses or certain types of offenses. However, treaties to which the United States became a
party after this date began to include the requirement of dual criminality as a preamble to the
list of extraditable offenses. Abbell and Ristau, 4 International Judicial Assistance § 13-2-4 at
56-57 (cited in note 46).
58. Bassiouni, 1 International Extradition ch. 7 at 325 (cited in note 46). See also Factor,
290 U.S. at 291 n.3, 292 n.4.
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requirement of dual criminality is found in applicable treaty
provisions and as a norm of customary international law, rather than
in statutes governing extradition procedure in the United States.5 9
Finally, the extradition magistrate examines the quantum of
evidence provided by the foreign state in support of its request for
extradition.60 The quantum of evidence required is significantly lower
than that required to sustain a criminal conviction 61 and has been
compared to a determination of probable cause in a criminal prelimi-
nary hearing.62
Upon a determination that these factors have been sufficiently
satisfied, the extradition magistrate is authorized to certify the ac-
cused as extraditable. 63 A finding of extraditability is entered and the
Secretary of State is authorized, though not required, to surrender the
accused to the requesting state.64
59. Wright, 190 U.S. at 58 (referring to both the customary and international law
requirement of dual criminality and the requirement imposed by treaty). The Court's
determination in Wright was displaced in Factor as the Court held that absent a specific dual
criminality requirement in the applicable treaty, none could be inferred. The Court applied the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius in assessing whether the treaty at issue contained
the dual criminality requirement. Moreover, the Court rejected the contention that customary
international law required dual criminality because United States extradition could occur only
pursuant to treaty. Factor, 290 U.S. at 299-301.
60. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, if, on the basis of the extradition hearing, the magistrate
"deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or
convention, he shall certify the same.., to the Secretary of State .... No section of the
statute, however, defines what quantum of evidence is necessary to meet the statutory
threshold of "sufficient."
61. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316-17 (1922). Collins is considered the landmark case
for establishing the quantum of evidence required to find the accused extraditable. In Collins,
the Court indicated that "[t]he function of the committing magistrate is to determine whether
there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial, and not to determine
whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction." Id. at 316.
Furthermore, neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure apply to the extradition hearing. See F.R.E. 1101(d)(3); F.R.Cr.P. 54(b)(5). Moreover,
the rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are much stricter for the accused than are the
rules for the requesting state. In Jimenez, the Fifth Circuit stated, "[t]he accused is not entitled
to introduce evidence which merely goes to his defense but he may offer limited evidence to
explain elements in the case against him, since the extradition proceeding is not a trial of the
guilt or innocence .... 311 F.2d at 556.
The low threshold of evidence and the rules pertaining to evidence are justified on the
theory that to require otherwise would necessitate that the requesting state pursue a full trial
on the merits in a foreign country and essentially obtain a conviction before extradition would
be possible. The low threshold appears then to be more consistent with the obligations incurred
by entering into an extradition treaty. Collins, 259 U.S. at 316-17.
62. See Ward, 921 F.2d at 287-88 (stating that an extradition hearing is akin to a
preliminary examination); Keinber, 683 F.2d at 455.
63. For a broad overview of the extradition hearing, see Bassiouni, 2 International
Extradition ch. 9 at 545 (cited in note 46).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
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3. The Process of Review
A determination of extraditability is not subject to correction
upon direct appeal.6 5 The domestic implementing legislation enacted
by Congress does not provide for review of the determination of extra-
ditability by such an appeal,66 and courts have uniformly held that
federal legislation authorizing appeal from final decisions of the
district courts does not apply to the decisions made by extradition
magistrates. 67
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of appealability
in 1847 in the case of In re Metzger.68 The extradition magistrate had
determined that Nicholas Metzger was extraditable upon a full hear-
ing in chambers according to the appropriate provisions of the extra-
dition treaty with France.69 In denying Metzger's petition for review,
the Court characterized the magistrate as acting under a special
65. Despite the lack of direct appellate review from an adverse determination in an
extradition hearing, the accused may file a writ of habeas corpus. The scope of the habeas
review is rather limited and extends only to the lawfulness of the order certifying the accused as
extraditable and addresses the legality of the detention of the accused. In other words, the
scope of review extends only to the determination of whether the magistrate had jurisdiction,
whether the offense charged is within the treaty, and whether there was any evidence at all
that the accused committed the crime. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
66. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 et seq. See also Abbell and Ristau, 4 International Judicial
Assistance § 13-2-2 at 41-42 (cited in note 46).
67. Holdings denying appeal pursuant to this rationale refer to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994 ed.)
which provides that "[t]he courts of appeals.., shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States .... " See, for example, In re Extradition of
Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1325 (1st Cir. 1993). In Howard, the court stated:
In light of this curious arrangement, numerous courts have held that 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
which permits appeals of "final decisions of the district courts"... does not contemplate
appeals from decisions of judicial officers sitting in extradition matters.... Given the
absence of any other hook on which jurisdiction over such appeals can be hung, a
putative extraditee customarily can challenge an order for extradition only by collateral
attack, typically through habeas corpus.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
68. 46 U.S. 176 (1847). Denial of direct review of the issue of extraditability was first
recognized in this case during the year prior to the original congressional legislation formally
requiring a judicial presence in the process of extradition.
69. The extradition treaty with France, unlike the Webster-Ashburn Treaty with Britain,
did not authorize the judiciary to participate in the extradition procedure. Act of Nov. 9, 1843, 8
Stat. 580. Despite this fact, the President and the Secretary of State chose to submit the extra-
dition request to a district court judge. After considering the matter in chambers, the judge
determined that the requisite threshold of extraditabiity had been met.
Upon commission of the accused as extraditable, Metzger petitioned the Supreme Court for
a writ of habeas corpus. The Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and stated:
There is no form in which an appellate power can be exercised by this court over the pro-
ceedings of a district judge at his chambers. He exercises a special authority, and the
law has made no provision for the revision of his judgment. It cannot be brought before
the District or Circuit Court; consequently it cannot, in the nature of an appeal, be
brought before this court.
Metzger, 46 U.S. at 191.
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authority for which the law made no provision for review. In other
words, the extradition magistrate was not relying on Article III judi-
cial power in making the determination of extraditability.
With the Court's holding in Metzger fresh in mind, Congress
enacted the first federal legislation specifically designed to formalize
the judicial presence in the extradition procedure in 1848.70 While the
floor debates on this legislation referred to the Court's holding in
Metzger, nothing either on the face of the statute or in its legislative
history signified any intent to alter the status of appealability. 71 In
the wake of the passage of this legislation, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its previous holding pertaining to appealability in the case of
In re Kaine,72 where it determined that the Act of 1848 did not
substantively alter the right to appeal an adverse determination in an
extradition proceeding. The Court relied on the same rationale found
in Metzger-that the magistrate was not exercising any part of the
judicial power of the United States.73
Taken together, Metzger, the Act of 1848, and Kaine provide
the cornerstone for the analysis of the power exercised by extradition
magistrates and the denial of appealability. Each of the three
branches of the federal government has extended support to the
theory that the extradition magistrate is not exercising any of the
judicial power-or Article III authority-in arriving at the
determination of extraditability.7 4 Their coinciding contentions have
become the primary justifications for denials of appealability.
70. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302. The legislation passed in 1848 still provides
the basic substantative framework for the current extradition legislation. See Abbell and
Ristau, 4 International Judicial Assistance § 13-2-2 at 41 (cited in note 46).
71. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 1986); Mackin, 668 F.2d at
127.
72. 55U.S. 103, 120 (1852).
73. The language of Justice Curtis, concurring in the judgment of the Court, typifies the
general perception of the extradition magistrate's actions:
Not only has the law made no provision for the revision of his acts by this court, but,
strictly speaking, he does not exercise any part of the judicial power of the United
States. That power can be exerted only by Judges, appointed by the President, with the
consent of the Senate, holding their offices during good behavior, and receiving fixed
salaries. The language of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in United States v. Ferreira, in
speaking of the powers exercised by a District Judge, and the Secretary of the Treasury,
under the Treaty with Spain of 1819, describes correctly, the nature of the authority of
such a Commissioner as acted in the case before us. "The powers conferred by Congress
upon the Judge, as well as the Secretary, are, it is true, judicial in their nature. For
judgment and discretion must be exercised by both of them. But it is not judicial, in
either case, in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the
courts of the United States."
Id. at 120.
74. In 1853, the Attorney General indicated that "(tihe judge or magistrate in this case
acts by special authority under the act of Congress; no appeal is given from his decision by the
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B. The Executive Decision to Extradite
The problem with the current extradition framework is not
found within the executive's authority to surrender an individual to
another nation. Constitutional difficulties arise when the executive
reviews an Article III judge's legal determinations and conclusions for
correctness prior to surrender. That process renders the judge's
opinion non-binding. An additional difficulty arises from the fact that
the judge is requested to reach these conclusions after performing an
extrajudicial inquiry. This type of relationship between the executive
and the judiciary is neither sanctioned by the Constitution nor
justified by separation of powers.
1. Executive Involvement: Origins and Rationale
At its simplest level, and separate from the inquiry of extra-
ditability, the surrender of an individual under the auspices of extra-
dition is a national act within the clear purview of the executive
branch of the federal government.7 5 Indeed, as indicated in the
Robbins case, at one time, the process of extradition was conducted
solely by the executive.7 6 Notwithstanding the development of the
act; and he does not exercise any part of what is, technically considered, the judicial power of
the United States." 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 91, 96 (1853). A decade later, the Attorney General again
specified that "[i]n cases of this kind, the judge or magistrate acts under special authority
conferred by treaties and acts of Congress; and though his action be in form and effect judicial,
it is yet not an exercise of any part of what is technically considered the judicial power of the
United States. No appeal from his decision is given by the law under which he acts, and
therefore no right to appeal exists." 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 501, 506 (1863) (citations omitted).
In accordance with the Executive Branch's considerations of the matter, the Senate
Judiciary Committee arrived at a similar conclusion. "[Tihe court issuing the writ of habeas
corpus is not to retry the case, or pass judgment upon the judgment of a commissioner who has
jurisdiction and legal and competent evidence before him .... [W]e could not recommend a
provision allowing a review of the whole case, but only such a one as would confine the review-
ing judge or tribunal to a [writ of habeas corpus]." S. Rep. No. 82, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. (1882).
All courts, including the Supreme Court, addressing the issue of appealability have con-
cluded that no direct appeal lies from the determination of the extradition magistrate and have
based their conclusion on jurisdictional grounds. See Mackin, 668 F.2d at 127-28 (examining
the historic treatment of appealability and citing cases).
The denial of direct appeal applies equally to the federal government. Because the finding
of extraditability is not a final judgment, the magistrate's determination has no res judicata
effect. No appeal can therefore be taken from such a finding, and the United States is free to
commence the extradition proceedings against the accused without jeopardy having attached.
See Doherty, 786 F.2d at 503 (denying the existence of an action for declaratory judgment by the
government in an extradition matter). Similarly, government attempts at attacking the deci-
sion of the extradition magistrate through the use of mandamus and declaratory judgment have
proven equally unsuccessful. See id. at 497-98; Mackin, 668 F.2d at 130-31 (denying the exis-
tence of certification to an appellate court in an extradition matter).
75. Bassiouni, 2 International Extradition ch. 9 at 601-02 (cited in note 46).
76. See Part III.A.1.
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office of the extradition magistrate, the notion that the power to ex-
tradite is a matter of foreign affairs and thus within the executive
branch's authority cannot be seriously challenged.7 7 The very nature
of an executive decision in the area of foreign affairs is political rather
than judicial. 78 Extradition epitomizes the need for one unified voice
in dealing with matters of national and international importance.
The decision to surrender an individual to another nation to stand
trial encompasses numerous considerations which other branches of
the federal government lack the constitutional competence to under-
take.7 9 However appealing the inclusion of the extradition magistrate
in the extradition process may be to our sense of liberty and fairness,
the ultimate authority to extradite is clearly a role for the executive.
The decision to extradite is properly confined to the executive branch
as neither the legislature nor the judiciary possesses the aptitude,
facilities or responsibility to engage in the requisite inquiries
accompanying the surrender of an individual to a foreign state.80
77. See Bassiouni, 2 International Extradition ch. 9 at 601-02 (cited in note 46) CThe
Executive, and in particular the President, conducts foreign affairs, and since the delivery or
receipt of a request is to or from another sovereign, it is within the constitutional province of the
Executive branch. Similarly, the actual delivery of the relator, and the conditions of his
delivery, to a foreign sovereign is also within the province of the Executive branch as a matter of
'foreign affairs' as defined by the Constitution.").
78. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948) ('Such [foreign policy] decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political
departments of the government, Executive and Legislative.").
79. In attempting to justify President John Adams's actions in the Robbins case, then
Representative John Marshall argued:
[T]he causus foederis, under the twenty-seventh article of the treaty with Great Britain,
is a question of law, but of political law. The question to be decided is, whether the
particular case proposed to be one in which the nation has bound itself to act, and this is
a question depending on principles never submitted to courts. The case was in its
nature a national demand made upon the nation. The parties were two nations. They
cannot come into court to litigate their claims, nor can a court decide them. Of
consequence, the demand is not a case for judicial cognizance. The President is the sole
representative with foreign nations. Of consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can
only be made on him.
10 Annals of Cong., 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 606, 613-14 (Mar. 7, 1800).
80. This does not mean that the executive should be able to pull someone from the street
and surrender him to any country requesting his presence to stand trial. While Congress may
not possess the competence to speak for the United States in matters of foreign intercourse, this
legislative body certainly has the ability to proscribe, within constitutional limits, the domestic
mechanisms through which the individual must proceed prior to surrender by the executive.
Consistent with this rationale, the judiciary is equally capable of determining whether compli-
ance with this legislation has been satisfied. However, despite any other inter-branch interac-
tion preceding the moment of surrender, the surrender of an individual must ultimately rest
within one branch of the federal government, and that branch is the executive.
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2. The Origin of the Executive Discretion to Extradite
The inception of the judicial presence in the process of extradi-
tion effectively relegated the Secretary of State to a largely ministe-
rial role.sl The surrender of the accused became largely contingent
upon the extradition magistrate's determination of extraditability8 2
At the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Secretary of State
began to break from traditional practice and to assert discretion in
deciding whether to surrender an individual despite the magistrate's
determination of extraditability.83
The first judicial recognition of such executive discretion oc-
curred in In re Stupp.84 In Stupp, a district court determined that the
Secretary of State had the power to refuse the surrender of the
individual to the requesting nation.85 The court interpreted the words
"that a warrant may issue" as granting the Secretary of State
discretionary power despite a judicial certification of extraditability8 6
In subsequent cases, numerous justifications have been advanced to
support the Secretary's refusal to grant surrender. These
justifications include humanitarian considerations,87  political
grounds,88 the nationality of the accused,89 and the finding of insuffi-
81. See John Bassett Moore, 1 Treatise on International Extradition and Interstate
Rendition 361 (1891) (describing the initial extradition framework and roles of the branches of
the federal government).
82. Id. See also 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 201, 205 (1843) (indicating that the determination of the
extradition magistrate is conclusive and is not to be questioned by the executive).
83. In 1871, seven individuals were certified as extraditable and were to be surrendered to
Britain. The Secretary of State, however, surrendered only four out of the seven and offered no
reason for the decision not to extradite the other three. See Moore, 1 Extradition at 310 (cited
in note 81).
84. 23 F. Cases 296 (No. 13,563) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875).
85. The court stated that "[the] refusal [to extradite] was in the exercise of an undoubted
right .... Under these provisions of law, the president has undoubtedly the right to refuse to
surrender the accused, even though a warrant of commitment for his surrender is issued by the
examining magistrate .... " Id. at 302.
86. Id.
87. See Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976) ("A denial of extradition by
the Executive may be appropriate when strong humanitarian grounds are present, but such
grounds exist only when it appears that, if extradited, the individual will be persecuted, not
prosecuted, or subjected to grave injustice."). See also Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914,
920 (2nd Cir. 1981) (stating that the United States retains the right to refuse to extradite an
individual if doing so would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations).
88. Courts have traditionally refused to inquire into the propriety of the procedures which
the foreign government will employ in the adjudication of the accused and have deferred the
consideration of this political question to the Secretary of State. Labeled the rule of
non-inquiry, the courts have determined this to be a policy determination better made by the
executive in such cases. See In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915) ("[I]t is not a part of
the court proceedings nor of the hearing upon the charge of crime to exercise discretion as to
whether the criminal charge is a cloak for political action .... Such matters should be left to
the Department of State."); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 516-17 (7th Cir. 1981) C'[The
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cient evidence to support the judicial determination of extraditabil-
ity.9 Despite the existence of a relatively long list of reasons offered
to justify the use of discretion by the executive, an executive finding of
insufficient evidence most clearly raises separation of powers
concerns.
3. Executive Review of the Finding of Extraditability
On its face, the legislation governing extradition does not ex-
pressly authorize executive review of the extradition magistrate's
determination of extraditability.91 However, the executive, the legis-
lature and the judiciary have each expressed support for the existence
of such executive authority. In each instance, the opinions not only
recognize the exercise of discretion, but also explicitly identify the
right of the executive to review the magistrate's determination for
correctness.
The executive has characterized the discretion to withhold the
surrender of the accused in fairly broad terms. In 1881, for example,
the Attorney General issued an opinion identifying the extent of ex-
ecutive discretion in reviewing the magistrate's finding.92  The
Secretary of State was said to receive the case from the magistrate on
quasi certiorari with discretion extending to a review of every ques-
tion presented therein.93 Members of the executive branch have
perceived this review power as affording the accused the double
Judiciary's deference to the Executive on the 'subterfuge' question is appropriate since political
questions would permeate any judgment on the motivation of a foreign government').
89. See Valentine, 299 U.S. at 12-13; Ex Parte McCabe, 46 F. 363 (W.D. Tex. 1891)
(commenting on the refusal to extradite due to the nationality of the accused).
90. For a discussion of executive determinations that insufficient evidence existed to
support the judicial determination of extraditability, see Part III.B.3.
For a more thorough discussion of the reasons offered in support of a refusal to extradite,
see Abbell and Ristau, 4 International Judicial Assistance at 180-311 (cited in note 46);
Bassiouni, 2 International Extradition ch. 9 at 601-04 (cited in note 46); Note, Executive
Discretion to Extradite, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1313 (1962).
91. See notes 12 and 13 for the text of the statute. See also cases cited in note 32 (relying
on a plain reading of the statute to avoid finding a separation of powers problem).
92. 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 184, 185 (1881).
93. The Solicitor General indicated that it would be difficult to perceive why the judicial
officer should be required to certify the evidence and testimony to the Secretary of State other
than to allow for review by the Secretary of State:
It may be said this is to beg the question, which is, whether the Secretary can look into
the evidence for the purpose of passing upon such question; i.e., whether such inquiry be
not coram non judice as to him. It is upon this point that the express statutory
requirement, that the testimony shall be certified to the Secretary, together with the
judgment below, is to my mind significant.
Id. at 185-86.
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protection of a concurrence of views by both the executive and the
judiciary.9 4
The members of the legislature and judiciary have expressed
similar support for the concept of executive review. The Senate
Judiciary Committee, for example, assessed the proper relationship
between the executive and the judiciary in an 1882 report on the ap-
pealability of extradition determinations. The Committee concluded
that the executive function of surrender necessarily carried with it the
power to review the prior proceedings, and ultimately, to pass judg-
ment on their correctness. 95
Judicial recognition of executive review occurred for the first
time in In re Heilbronn,16 decided in 1854. The court observed that if
the executive had determined that sufficient evidence did not exist to
sustain the magistrate's finding, then the executive had a duty to
refrain from surrendering the accused. 97 The text of the opinion
seems then to condition surrender upon a mandatory review by the
executive. 98
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYSIS
The Framers of the Constitution defined tyranny as the accu-
mulation of all power-legislative, executive, and judicial-in the
94. Id. at 187. ("[T]he law gives to the party charged the double protection of a
concurrence of views upon all questions affecting his guilt under the treaty by the magistrate
and the Secretary before he is to be surrendered."). The Department of State has similarly
commented that the magistrate's decision does not bind the executive, and that, as such, the
evidence could be properly reviewed and a contrary determination reached. 3 Dept. of State
Legal Advisory Op. 2356, 2357 (1931). It is consistent with this interpretation that the
executive has on occasion exercised review over the magistrate's certification of extraditability.
See Green Haywood Hackworth, 4 Digest of International Law 186-93 (Dept. of State, 1942)
(citing cases).
95. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 82 (1882).
96. 11 F. Cases 1025, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1854) (No. 6,323).
97. Id.
98. The court stated:
In such a case no one can revise the opinion of the commissioner but the president. The
president has that power. If he should be of the opinion that the evidence taken before
the commissioner on the hearing was not sufficient to sustain the charge, then it would
be his duty to withhold a warrant of extradition.
Id. at 1031. Similar viewpoints can be found in various other sources. See Stupp, 23 F. Cases at
302; Note, 62 Colum. L. Rev. at 1319 (cited in note 90) ("In several cases the executive has
grounded a refusal to surrender the fugitive upon the insufficiency of evidence presented in
support of the complaint."); Bassiouni, 2 International Extradition ch. 9 at 601-04 (cited in note
46).
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same hands.99 They therefore sought to preserve personal liberty
through horizontal and vertical separation of powers among different
institutions. 100 The Framers therefore created a government with
powers distinctly separated among three branches. Though not spe-
cifically mentioned in the text of the Constitution, the principle of
separation of powers is recognized as implicitly woven into the docu-
ment's text.'10
The judiciary is inherently the weakest of the three branches.
It lacks both the "power of the sword" and the "power of the purse":
unlike the executive, the judiciary exercises no power over the foreign
intercourse of the United States, its military, or law enforcement
personnel, and unlike the legislature, the judiciary has no authority to
levy taxes or appropriate money. For these reasons, the judiciary is
generally perceived to be the branch least likely to threaten individual
liberty.
The power and influence of the judiciary is derived from the
public's need for a tribunal to which all may appeal for the assertion
and protection of constitutional rights.102 This power and influence is
further strengthened by the confidence reposed in the soundness of its
judgments and the purity of its motives. The judiciary's authority and
the public's compliance with its decisions depend on the integrity of
its judges and the public's perception of that integrity.0 3 In short, the
judiciary is highly dependent on the moral force of its judgments.
On several occasions, Congress has attempted to alter the
balance of power between the three branches of government. When
such efforts have involved the judicial branch, members of the federal
judiciary have employed a particularly cautious methodology in
evaluating whether the congressional action threatens their ability to
99. Federalist No. 47 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 301
(Mentor, 1961).
100. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-96; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986). In
writing on the subject of separation of powers, Madison indicated "[n]o political truth is cer-
tainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of
liberty." Federalist No. 47 (Madison) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 301 (cited in note
99).
101. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) ('CThe principle of separation of powers
was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the
document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.").
102. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 223 (1882) (describing the inherent weakness of the
judiciary and its dependency on the moral force of its judgments).
103. Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F. Supp. 477, 479 (D.D.C. 1980) ('In the final analysis, the
Judiciary's authority and the general compliance with its decisions depends upon the integrity
of the judges and the public's perception of that integrity.").
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perform their constitutionally assigned duties. 1 4  The Supreme
Court's approach to separation of powers jurisprudence in this context
has been characterized by the competing application of formalist and
functionalist ideologies,105 which can yield inconsistent results. Many
commentators have criticized the Court's lack of consistency and
reluctance to adopt a single methodology when addressing this is-
sue.106 Despite the potential inconsistencies and uncertainties en-
countered in separation of powers cases, both formal and functional
analyses demonstrate that the extradition procedure embodied in
section 3184 involves an unconstitutional violation of the separation
of powers principle.
A. A Formalist Analysis of Extradition
There is no liberty if the power of the judging be not separated from the
legislative and the executive. 1
07
The formalist interpretation of separation of powers concen-
trates primarily on whether a particular branch of the federal gov-
ernment is acting within the scope of authority granted it by the
Constitution according to the literal language of that document and
the Framers' original intent.0 8 The basic foundation of formalism
requires the legislature to make, the executive to execute, and the
judiciary to construe, the law.10 9 Consistent with these principles,
formalists interpret the constitution to demarcate the powers as-
signed to each of the branches of the federal government explicitly.11O
104. See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1453 (rejecting congressional attempts to reopen final
judgments of federal courts); Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 111 (rejecting
attempts to subject judicial decisions to executive review).
105. See note 8.
106. Id.
107. Montesquieu, 1 Spirit of the Laws 181, quoted in Federalist No. 47 (Madison) in
Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 302 (cited in note 99).
108. See Brown, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1523 (cited in note 8) (indicating that formalists
"seek judicial legitimacy by insisting upon a firm textual basis in the Constitution for any
governmental ace').
109. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 46 (1825) (The difference between the departments
undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes
the law .... ).
110. Article I, § 1 indicates "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States...." Article II, § 2 indicates "The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America...." Article III, § 1 specifies 'The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Moreover, Article III
establishes a "judicial department" with the "province and duty ... to say what the law is" in
particular cases and controversies. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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Furthermore, the text of the Constitution is thought by formalists to
define when and to what extent these powers may permissibly com-
mingle."'
Formalism demands adherence to the power structure estab-
lished primarily by the first three articles of the Constitution.112 For
this reason, greater value is assigned to the text of the Constitution
than to notions of efficiency, convenience, or flexibility."3 A formal
separation of powers analysis in the extradition context necessarily
concentrates on the roles played by the executive and judiciary and
focuses on whether these roles are consistent with those contemplated
by the Constitution.
111. Even those who consider themselves formalists cannot disregard Madison's
assessment of the principle of separation of powers in Federalist No. 47, when he considered the
meaning of Montesquieu's words:
[Hie did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no
control over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still
more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than
this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a
free constitution are subverted.
Federalist No. 47 (Madison) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 302-03 (cited in note 99).
However, in addressing the implications of Madison's statement, it has been argued that the
Constitution defines the extent of permissible commingling of the branches of the federal
government through its very terms and that anything beyond its explicit boundaries is imper-
missible. In this regard, the Constitution is considered a definitive compilation of the accept-
able commingling of federal power. The complete and express delineations of permissible
commingling of the powers granted by the Constitution include: the Senate's ability to try the
impeachment of the executive and judicial officials pursuant to Article I, § 3, cl. 6; the
congressional power to define the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts pursuant to Article
III, § 1; the presidential veto pursuant to Article II, § 7, cl. 2; and the senatorial confirmation of
executive and judicial appointees pursuant to Article II, § 2, cl. 2. The commingling of powers
beyond those expressly provided for in the Constitution would essentially violate separation of
powers. See Arthur C. Leahy, Note, Mistretta v. United States: Mistreating the Separation of
Powers Doctrine?, 27 San Diego L. Rev. 209, 229-30 (1990) (tracing Federalist Papers 47 to 51 in
determining that the entire scope of permissible commingling of functions can be found within
the text of the Constitution).
112. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726 ("Time and again we have reaffirmed the importance in
our constitutional scheme of the separation of governmental powers into the three coordinate
branches.").
113. See, for example, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (stating "it is crystal
clear.., that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency" and "we have not yet
found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the
carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution"). See also Morrison, 487 U.S. at
710-11 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 93 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787,
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power .... The purpose was
not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.").
1996] EXTRADITION PROCEDURE 1265
1. Formalism and Extradition Procedure
Formal separation of powers requires that the judiciary be
entirely free from the control and the coercive influence of the execu-
tive.11 4 A formal assessment of separation of powers in the context of
the extradition procedure requires two separate inquiries. The first
examines the propriety of executive review of Article III judicial de-
terminations and the rendition of advisory opinions by these same
judges. The second focuses on the legislative requirement that Article
III judges serve as extradition magistrates in an extrajudicial
capacity.
a. The Issuance of Advisory Opinions and Executive Review of
Judicial Determinations
i. The Prohibition Against Advisory Opinions and Extradition
It has been a long-standing policy of the federal judiciary to
refuse to issue advisory opinions to the legislature and the executive.
This policy is derived from the core of Article III's limitation on
federal judicial power." 5 It directly serves the concept of separation of
powers by limiting the judicial role to deciding actual disputes rather
than giving advice to the Congress or to the President.
This limitation is a constitutional requirement that confines
the power of federal courts within proper boundaries and prevents
judicial intrusion on the prerogatives of the coordinate branches. 116
By remaining separate, courts offer effective protection from abuses of
power and avoid becoming the organs of political theories. 17 The
114. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ('CThe fundamen-
tal necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free
from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been
stressed and is hardly open to serious question.").
115. Article III of the Constitution states: "The Judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases... [and] Controversies." U.S. Const., Art. III., §§ 1, 2. See Fast, 392 U.S. at 96-97
C'T]he implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not history alone, impose the rule against
advisory opinions .... [The rule] implements the separation of powers [and] also recognizes
that such suits often 'are not pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided
when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary
argument exploring every aspect of a multifaced situation embracing conflicting and demanding
interests.' ").
116. Laurence N. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 3-7 at 67 (Foundation Press 2d ed.
1988).
117. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90-91 (1947) (indicating that the
issuance of advisory opinions would enmesh the federal courts in political controversies).
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issuance of an advisory opinion would involve Article III judges too
intimately in the process of policy properly reserved for the executive
and legislature, and thereby weaken public confidence in the
disinterestedness of the judiciary.118
In order for a case to be justiciable and not advisory, two es-
sential criteria must be met. Initially, there must be an actual dis-
pute between adverse litigants.119 Secondly, there must be a substan-
tial likelihood that the decision rendered by the court will have some
effect or bring about some change. This requirement is based on the
Hayburn's Case120-the same case which established the closely re-
lated prohibition against executive review of judicial determinations.
In Hayburn's Case, the Court contemplated whether federal courts
could issue non-binding opinions on the amounts of benefits owed to
Revolutionary War veterans. 121 In 1792, Congress had enacted a bill
designed to provide pension benefits to veterans. The bill granted the
federal circuit court judges the authority to assess and grant these
benefits, subject to review by the Secretary of War and Congress.1l2
Although Congress eventually repealed this part of the bill, the circuit
judges sitting on the Supreme Court wrote individually to indicate
their reluctance to perform these duties.
Members of the New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania
Circuit Courts expressed their disapproval of the legislation that
Congress had enacted. The members of each court concluded that the
powers conferred by Congress could not properly be exercised by an
Article III court. The justices explained that the task of making rec-
ommendations either to Congress or to the executive was "not of a
judicial nature."'123 The rendering of an advisory opinion in this con-
text was deemed radically inconsistent with separation of powers and
118. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 511-12 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (cautioning against the issu-
ance of advisory opinions).
119. This requirement originated in the very early days of the United States. Then-
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson requested that the Supreme Court respond to numerous
questions regarding the neutrality of the United States in the war between France and
England. The questions concentrated on the meaning of several federal laws and treaties in the
context of the war, and President Washington had requested the opinion of the Court on these
matters. The justices of the Court refused to respond to the Presidents request on the grounds
that separation of powers prevented the Court from advising another branch of the federal
government. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 48-49 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1994).
120. 2 U.S. 408 (1792).
121. Id.
122. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 234-44. The act was entitled "An Act to provide for
the settlement of the Claims of Widows and Orphans barred by the limitations heretofore
established, and to regulate the Claims of Invalid Persons."
123. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 411.
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with the independence of the judicial power vested in Article III
courts. 
1 2 4
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion on the the
issuance of advisory opinions in United States v. Ferreira.125 In
Ferreira, Congress had passed a statute authorizing a federal district
court in Florida to hear and adjudicate claims under an 1819 treaty
that ceded Florida to the United States from Spain.126  As in
Hayburn's Case, the results of the judicial proceedings were to be
reported to an executive official, the Secretary of the Treasury.127 The
Secretary would then make the determination as to whether to pay
the claims, essentially rendering the opinion by the judge in Florida
advisory.128 The Court determined that the advisory function per-
formed by the judge in this scenario was completely anomalous to the
proper Article III functions of the federal judiciary. 129
124. The members of the New York Circuit Court, including Chief Justice Jay, Justice
Cushing, and Judge Duane, indicated that legislation requring advisory opinions by members of
the judiciary would inherently undermine basic structural components of the Constitution based
on separation of powers. The judges explained:
That by the Constitution of the United States, the government thereof is divided into
three distinct and independent branches, and that it is the duty of each to abstain from,
and to oppose, encroachments on either. That neither the Legislature nor the Executive
branches, can constitutionally assign to the Judicial any duties, but such as are properly
judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner. That the duties assigned to the
Circuit Courts by this act, are not of that description, and that the act itself does not
appear to contemplate them as such.
Id.
The members of the North Carolina Circuit Court, including Justice Iredell and Judge
Sitgreaves, echoed the concern of the New York court and stated "[t]hat the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial departments, are each formed in a separate and independent manner;
and that the ultimate basis of each is the Constitution only, within the limits of which each
department can alone justify any act of authority." Id. at 412.
125. 54 U.S. 40 (1851).
126. Id. at 46.
127. Id. at 47.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 48. The Court stated:
The powers conferred by these acts of Congress upon the judge as well as the Secretary,
are, it is true, judicial in their nature. For judgment and discretion must be exercised
by both of them. But it is nothing more than the power ordinarily given by law to a
commissioner appointed to adjust claims to lands or money under a treaty; or special
powers to inquire into or decide any other particular class of controversies in which the
public or individuals may be concerned. A power of this description may constitutionally
be conferred on a Secretary as well as on a commissioner. But is not judicial in either
case, in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of
the United States.
Id. See also Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 113 ("But if the President may
completely disregard the judgment of the court, it would be only because it is one the courts
were not authorized to render. Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by
another Department of Government.").
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The fundamental formalist arguments underlying these opin-
ions are quite clear. Articles I and III of the Constitution have as-
signed particular functions to the executive and others to the judici-
ary. Statutes such as those depicted in Hayburn's Case and Ferreira
attempted to subvert the Constitution's assignments. Formalist sepa-
ration of powers analysis specifically rejects such attempts to blur the
lines drawn between the executive and the judiciary.
The extradition statute poses problems that are undeniably
similar to those encountered by the Court in Hayburn's Case and
Ferreira. The requirement that a federal judge sitting as an extradi-
tion magistrate reach a conclusion concerning the issue of extra-
ditability and then certify this conclusion to the Secretary of State for
final consideration closely resembles the duties and roles of the judges
in the cases previously examined. From a formalist standpoint, all
three situations require the judge to render an advisory opinion to the
executive, and all three grant the executive the ultimate authority to
review the judge's determination and decide whether to act in
accordance with the issued opinion. In essence, the judge's decision is
neither final nor binding on the parties at issue in a particular
extradition hearing. 13 0
The judge is required to make a non-binding certification to a
member of the executive branch, who then has the authority to accept
the judge's advisement or reject it. An executive decision to disregard
the opinion of the extradition magistrate prohibits the requesting
nation from obtaining satisfaction of the magistrate's determination.
Similarly, because res judicata does not attach to the magistrate's
conclusion on the issue of extraditability, 131 repeated attempts to
extradite the accused can be made. In this regard, an individual
facing possible trial in a foreign country following numerous
extradition hearings would certainly concur that the opinion of the
extradition magistrate was neither final nor binding on the re-
questing nation. For these reasons, the role contemplated for the
federal judiciary by the extradition statute is advisory rather than
130. Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 71. The court indicated "if an extradition judge determines
that a particular extradition request may not lawfully be granted, this decision is not legally
binding upon either the government or the accused. The government may not appeal the
decision. More importantly, however, the extradition judge's determination of non-
extraditability has no res judicata effect." Id. (citing Collins, 262 U.S. at 429-30). See also
Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that "the government is free to
pursue extradition notwithstanding initial unsuccessful efforts").
131. Matter of Extradition of McMullen, 989 F.2d 603, 612-13 (2d Cir. 1993) (indicating that
"neither the doctrine of resjudicata nor the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy
would apply [to a determination of extraditability]") (citing Collins, 262 U.S. at 430).
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dispositive and exceeds the scope of judicial power afforded by the
Constitution. 132
ii. Executive Review and Extradition
Closely akin to the prohibition against the issuance of advisory
opinions, formal separation of powers prohibits executive review of
judicial determinations. The Court in both Hayburn's Case and
Ferreira considered the permissibility of the executive review scheme
in the relevant legislation. In each case, the Court specified that
because the Constitution vested the judicial power exclusively in the
judiciary, it would be unconstitutional to allow either the executive or
the legislature to sit as a court of errors by reviewing judicial judg-
ments. 133 In subsequent cases, the Court has consistently prohibited
statutes envisioning either executive or legislative review of judicial
determinations.134
Decisions of extradition magistrates have been subject to ex-
ecutive review and revision in the past. 35 On numerous occasions,
the Secretary of State has determined that the extradition magistrate
has reached an erroneous conclusion when issuing a determination
that an individual was properly extraditable.13s Moreover, the statute
governing extradition explicitly mandates that the extradition magis-
trate certify the evidence of extraditability to the Secretary of State.13 7
At least one court has made reference to the fact that the delivered
evidence comes to the Secretary on quasi-certiorari-a conclusion that
132. See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1453 (stating accurately that the judicial power of the United
States is the power to render dispositive judgments).
133. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 410; Ferreira, 54 U.S. at 48. In Hayburn's Case, the Court
objected to the prospect of executive review "inasmuch as it subjects the decisions of these
courts, made pursuant to those duties, first to the consideration and suspension of the secretary
at war, and then to the revision of the legislature; whereas, by the constitution, neither the
secretary at war, nor any other executive officer, nor even the legislature, [is] authorized to sit
as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court." Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 411.
134. See, for example, Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1453 (stating that "Congress cannot vest review
of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch"); Chicago & Southern
Airlines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 113 ("Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by
another Department of Government."). Montesquieu commented that such a situation enables
the executive to act as an oppressor: "Were the power of judging.., joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor." Montesquieu, The Spirit of
the Laws, in Federalist No. 47 (Madison) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 303 (cited in
note 99).
135. For a discussion of past executive review and revision of magistrates' extradition
determinations, see Parts III.B.2. and III.B.3.
136. Id.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
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necessarily violates separation of powers from a formalist
perspective. 138
The extradition statute essentially allows the whole power of
the judiciary in a particular case to be vested in the executive. 13 9
Furthermore, it fails to take account of the fundamental necessity of
keeping each of the branches of government entirely free from the
control or coercive influence of the others. 40 Admittedly, this formal-
ist analysis fails to consider the perception that the extradition
magistrate relies on a special grant of authority and not an Article III
power when making the extraditablity determination.'4' This percep-
tion, however, immediately raises another issue: the propriety of
extrajudicial service 4 2 by an Article III judge.
b. The Propriety of Extrajudicial Service
The Constitution explicitly extends to the federal judiciary only
the "judicial Power of the United States" and restricts its exercise to
"Cases" and "Controversies."'4 3 The Supreme Court has consequently
defined the judiciary's role in terms of a duty to interpret and apply
the laws of the United States in cases properly before Article III
courts and to resolve controversies between adverse litigants insti-
tuted in courts of proper jurisdiction.'4 The case or controversy re-
138. See Carreno, 899 F. Supp. at 631 (referring to a letter written by a former Secretary of
State).
139. See generally Federalist No. 47 (Madison) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at
300 (cited in note 99). In describing the essential attributes of the executive and judiciary in the
context of separation of powers, Madison commented "[t]he magistrate in whom the whole
executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every
law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do
administer it" Id. at 303. Montesquieu saw these restrictions and others like them as of
paramount importance in the prevention of tyranny. From a formalist perspective, however, it
appears as though Congress has subverted these requirements by enacting a statute which
history has demonstrated allows the executive to review the determinations of the extradition
magistrate. While the inclusion of the judiciary in the extradition process may have satisfied
those opposed to a unitary executive in total control, the scheme ultimately sacrifices the
delineations of executive and judicial power from a formalist standpoint.
140. See Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629-30 (stressing the importance of such
separation).
141. For a discussion of cases relying on such a rationale, see Part III.A-3.
142. Extra-judicial service has been defined as the performance of activities outside the
courtroom that are not connected with the Article III judicial office and that do not involve
improvement of the legal system embodied and contemplated by Article III. See Mark Scott
Bagula and Judge Robert C. Coates, Trustees of the Justice System: Quasi-Judicial Activity and
the Failure of the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 617, 627-28
(1994).
143. U.S. Const., Art. III, §§ 1, 2.
144. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (defining the scope of Article III
judicial power); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (same). See also United
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quirement thus defines for the judiciary the very idea of separation of
powers.14 5
Equally beyond debate is the recognition that the federal
courts should carefully abstain from exercising power that is not
derived from the specific grant of authority found in the Constitu-
tion.14G Formalists would reject outright Congress's attempt to bypass
this requirement by bestowing non-Article III duties on judges rather
than courts. 47
While extrajudicial service is not foreign to members of the
federal judiciary,141 formalism would not accept this past performance
as a constitutional authorization of such service. 149 The performance
of extrajudicial duties by Article III judges interferes with the per-
formance of constitutionally prescribed judicial duties and has the
effect of "undermining the integrity, impartiality, [and] independence
of the judiciary,"10 as well as the language of Article III.
Article III judges serving as extradition magistrates in an
extrajudicial capacity are not appointed as separate commissioners
completely severed from their judicial moorings. Rather, these judges
retain their involvement with the judiciary and are compelled to sit as
States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980). In Geraghty, the Court stated,
"[t]he case or controversy requirement defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to
other branches of government." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 18 U.S.C.
§ 3189 does not require that extradition magistrates conduct extradition hearings in courts.
Such hearings need only take place on public land. One can only imagine the implications of
conducting an extradition hearing in the middle of the town square or at the local state
university.
145. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
146. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 355 (quoting Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 706
(1864)).
147. See David P. Currie, Federal Courts: Cases and Materials 8-10 (West, 2d ed. 1975). In
Hayburn's Case, some members of the Court contemplated performing the requested function
individually as commissioners instead of as a court. Professor Currie has commented that
"[w]hatever the vice of the pension statute, it is difficult to believe that the trouble was
eliminated by the use of a pseudonym." Id. at 8.
148. See generally Robert B. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 9 (1970); Peter Alan Bell, Note, Extrajudicial Activity of Supreme Court
Justices, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 587 (1969-70); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for
Judges: The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1953). See also Nonjudicial
Activities of Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 1st Sess.
(1969). Situations in which federal judges have been authorized to perform extrajudicial service
generally extend to matters directly affecting the efficient performance of judicial functions. See
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1970).
149. But see Matter of President's Commission on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scarfo, 783
F.2d 370, 375 (3rd Cir. 1986) (finding an inherent distinction between conferring extrajudicial
duties on Article III judges individually and placing such duties on courts qua courts).
150. See Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 5(g) (Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, 1987).
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extradition magistrates precisely because they are judges. Moreover,
the judicial branch is directly implicated by the very nature of the
task that the extradition magistrate is to perform. The extradition
magistrate is required to interpret treaty provisions, assess and weigh
evidence, and apply principles of law to facts. From a formalist
standpoint, simply renaming the Article III judge as an extradition
magistrate and specifying that the magistrate is functioning in an
extrajudicial capacity is not sufficient to alleviate the problems
encountered in the extradition procedure.
2. Assessing the Formalist Analysis
The formalist perspective admittedly restricts the federal
government from responding creatively to unique issues like extradi-
tion. Declaring the extradition law unconstitutional from this per-
spective would also temporarily cripple the United States's ability to
adhere to its international obligations, thereby impacting other areas
of American foreign policy. However, reliance on a formalist analysis
safeguards the text of the Constitution, the Framers' intent, and the
integrity of the federal judiciary-three features of the American po-
litical structure that most would agree are worth protecting.
B. A Functional Analysis of Extradition Procedure
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also con-
templates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity. 151
The functional approach to separation of powers concentrates
on whether an action performed by one branch impermissibly
interferes with a core function of another. 15 Functionalism makes
allowances for the sharing of powers among the branches of the
federal government to the extent that the basic principles of
separation of powers are preserved. 153 Consistent with this approach,
151. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
152. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 776 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he role of this Court should
be limited to determining whether the [the act at issue] so alters the balance of authority among
the branches of government as to pose a genuine threat to the basic division between the
lawmaking power and the power to execute the law.").
153. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). In Nixon,
the Court rejected the notion that separation of powers required "three airtight departments of
government" and stated:
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functionalism envisions certain extra-constitutional commingling or
shifting of powers as essentially endorsed by the drafters of the
Constitution.'54
In essence, functionalism requires a determination of whether
a particular practice undermines central constitutional commit-
ments. 55 The text of the Constitution and the intent of the drafters,
while relevant, give way to the basic structural values and functions
of the Constitution.156 Functionalists encourage judicial restraint and
afford a greater degree of deference to the scenarios and schemes
created by the two majoritarian branches of the federal government.
A drawback of the functional perspective is the difficulty a
judge or court faces in determining the values and functions that are
central to the Constitution and the extent to which these can be al-
tered in any given situation.5 7 For this reason, critics of a functional
approach point to the potential unpredictability and indeterminacy in
its ad hoc analysis of separation of powers issues. 158
[I]n determining whether [a situation] disrupts the proper balance between the coordi-
nate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents [a branch of
the federal government] from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.... Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then
determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives
within the constitutional authority of [another branch].
Id. Moreover, at one time during the early history of the United States, Congress rejected the
addition of a new article to the Constitution which would have definitively specified the extent
to which powers were to be divided. This article, proposed by James Madison, mandated that:
The powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to the departments to which
they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never exercise
the powers vested in the executive or judicial; nor the executive exercise the powers
vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in the
legislative or executive departments.
Charles F. Hobson and Robert N. Rutland, eds., 12 The Papers of James Madison 202 (U. of
Virginia, 1979).
154. There is support for such a view in the writings of the Framers. See Federalist No. 47
(Madison) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 301 (cited in note 99) (specifying that the
separation of powers did not mean that the branches of the federal government were intended to
remain hermetically sealed). See also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 ("[The Court has] never held
that the Constitution requires that the three branches of Government 'operate with absolute
independence.' ").
155. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 495
(1987).
156. Brown, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1528 (cited in note 8). These basic values have been
referred to as the unitary execution of laws, the avoidance of factionalism, protection against
self-interested or unaccountable representation, and promotion of deliberation in government.
Sunstein, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 495-96 (cited in note 155).
157. See Sunstein, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 494-96 (cited in note 155).
158. See, for example, Brown, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1528 (cited in note 8); Stephen L.
Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative
Government, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 357, 375-76 (1990).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
With these possible criticisms in mind, however, conducting a
functional analysis of the extradition procedure requires a determi-
nation of the constitutional values and functions at issue and an as-
sessment of whether these values and functions are impermissibly
threatened by the roles the executive and judiciary are expected to
perform.
1. Functionalism and Extradition Procedure
At first glance, extrajudicial service and executive review
appear to be permissible under a functional approach to separation of
powers. The combination of extrajudicial service and executive review
allows the presence of a judicial decisionmaker to legitimize the
extradition procedure, while still affording the executive complete
control over the ultimate decision to extradite. Closer inspection,
however, reveals that the values furthered by extrajudicial service
and the standards demarcating the extent of its propriety fail to
authorize the extrajudicial function performed by a federal judge as
an extradition magistrate. Consequently, even a functional approach
to separation of powers makes it clear that the United States
extradition procedure is unconstitutional.
a. The Functional Justification For Extrajudicial Service
The propriety of extrajudicial service depends on viewing
separation of powers as applying to institutions rather than individu-
als. 159 The Constitution contains only one express incompatibility
clause, a clause precluding legislators from performing joint service in
another department of the federal government. 160 No similar con-
stitutional provision precludes federal judges and justices from serv-
ing in an extrajudicial capacity.16' Thus, functionalists look to
159. See Solomon Slonim, Extrajudicial Activities and the Principle of the Separation of
Powers, 49 Conn. Bar J. 391, 408-10 (1975). In assessing Madison's statement in Federalist No.
47 that separation of powers is violated only when the whole power of one department is
exercised by the same hands that possess the whole power of another department, Professor
Slonim indicates that "[iut follows from this that an individual in one department of government
who belongs to, or exercises the powers of a different department does not thereby violate the
principle of the separation of powers." Id. at 408. From this perspective, the separation of
powers inquiry turns on what scope the drafters intended this doctrine to have. Id. See also
Stephen G. Calabresi and Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or
Separation of Personnel?, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1994) (considering separation of powers as
institutional rather than personal).
160. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
161. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 397-98 CThe text of the Constitution contains no prohibition
against the service of active federal judges on independent commissions .... The Constitution
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whether the integrity, impartiality, or independence of the judiciary
will be compromised by the performance of a particular extrajudicial
function. 162
Prior to its express authorization of extrajudicial service in
Mistretta v. United States,163 the Supreme Court and other lower
courts had alluded to the permissibility of the performance of
extrajudicial functions on several occasions. The Court's
consideration of the statute at issue in Hayburn's Case demonstrated
that members of the original executive and legislative departments
believed that federal judges could constitutionally hold executive
positions or perform executive duties in an extrajudicial capacity. 64
Similarly, in Ferreira, the Court alluded to the fact that a federal
district judge in Florida could perform as a commissioner in an
extrajudicial capacity. 65  In each case, the prospect of executive
review of the extrajudicial function performed by the commissioner
appeared not to offend the Court's notions of separation of powers.166
This reading of Hayburn's Case and Ferreira has subsequently
been afforded support by courts when undertaking a separation of
powers analysis of extrajudicial service. In Matter of the President's
does include an Incompatibility Clause applicable to national legislators .... [However], [n]o
comparable restriction applies to judges.").
162. See id. at 381 (considering the propriety of extrajudicial service by federal judges on
the Federal Sentencing Commission); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 433; Code of Judicial Conduct for
United States Judges, Canon 5(g) C'A judge should not. . accept such an [extrajudicial]
appointment if the judge's governmental duties would interfere with the performance of judicial
duties or tend to undermine the integrity, impartiality, or independence of the judiciary.").
163. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
164. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 410. The members of the New York Circuit Court expressed
this view and stated:
As, therefore, the business assigned to this court, by the act, is not judicial, nor directed
to be performed judicially, the act can only be considered as appointing commissioners
for the purposes mentioned in it, by official instead of personal description. That the
judges of this court regard themselves as being the commissioners designated by the act,
and therefore, as being at liberty to accept or decline that office. That as the objects of
this act are exceedingly benevolent, and do real honor to the humanity and justice of
congress; and as the judges desire to manifest, on all proper occasions, and in every
proper manner, their high respect for the national legislature, they will execute this act
in the capacity of commissioners.
Id.
165. Ferreira, 54 U.S. at 47.
166. Id. Chief Justice Taney found no "ground for objection to the power of revision and
control given to the Secretary of the Treasury." This belief expressed by Justice Taney hinged
on the notion that the power utilized by the district court judge, although in form and effect
judicial, did not originate in Article III of the Constitution. Id. at 46-47. It should be noted,
however, that in neither Hayburn's Case nor Ferreira did the Supreme Court directly reach the
issue of extrajudicial service or executive review. In Hayburn's Case, Congress repealed the
statute prior to the Court's consideration of the issue and in Ferreira, the Court dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
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Commission on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scarfo,167 the Third
Circuit explicitly stated that the language used by the Supreme Court
in Ferreira could be interpreted to allow the imposition of
extrajudicial duties on Article III judges individually---"duties that
under the separation of powers doctrine [could] not be imposed on the
courts qua courts."68 Moreover, in Mistretta v. United States, the
Supreme Court indicated that "Ferreira, like Hayburn's Case,
suggests that Congress may authorize a federal judge, in an
individual capacity, to perform an Executive function without
violating separation of powers." 169
The role and actions of the extradition magistrate appear to be
consistent with other examples of extrajudicial service. 170 Authority to
hear extradition matters was bestowed upon the judges and justices
of the federal courts individually and not as courts.' 7' This is
comparable to the authority granted to the members of the judiciary
in the cases previously considered.7 2 This consistency, however, does
not automatically equate to constitutionality. Though decidedly more
flexible than formalism, even the functional approach to separation of
powers defines certain limits regarding the permissible extent of
extrajudicial service.
b. The Propriety of Extrajudicial Service
A functional approach to separation of powers requires a de-
termination as to whether the act in question so alters the balance of
167. 783 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1986).
168. Id. at 375. The Third Circuit considered whether it was permissible for federal judges
to sit on a commission located in the executive branch. The court concluded that the
participation of the judges on this commission did not violate principles of separation of powers.
Id. at 381. Compare Application of President's Commission on Organized Crime Subpoena of
Scaduto, 763 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding the judges' participation on the Commission to
violate separation of powers).
169. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 403. In characterizing the actions of the federal judges in
serving as commissioners on the Federal Sentencing Commission, the Court also stated:
The judges serve on the Sentencing Commission not pursuant to their status and
authority as Article III judges, but solely because of their appointment by the President
as the Act directs. Such power as these judges wield as Commissioners is not judicial
power; it is administrative power derived from the enabling legislation .... In other
words, the Constitution, at least as a per se matter, does not forbid judges to wear two
hats; it merely forbids them to wear both hats at the same time.
Id. at 404.
170. The Act of Oct. 17, 1968 amended the extradition legislation and substituted the word
"magistrate" for "commissioner" in the statute.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The statute confers authority to hear extradition matters directly on
"any justice or judge of the United States" and makes no mention of conferring jurisdiction on a
particular court.
172. See Ferreira, 54 U.S. at 49; Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 409 n.1.
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power among the three branches of government as to pose a genuine
threat to the basic constitutional divisions. 173  The analysis
concentrates on whether the action of one branch impermissibly
interferes with the core functions of another. 174 In cases pertaining to
the propriety of extrajudicial service, the Supreme Court's holding in
Mistretta has fashioned a vague and flexible standard allowing this
service to be considered on a case-by-case basis.175 The two-part
inquiry fashioned by the Mistretta Court contemplates: (1) whether
the function assigned to the judicial branch would be better
accomplished by either the legislature or executive;1 76 and (2) whether
the assigned function impermissibly threatens the institutional
integrity of the judicial branch.177
i. The Location of the Position of Extradition Magistrate
Within the Judicial Branch
In its assessment of whether the Federal Sentencing
Commission was properly located in the judicial branch, the Mistretta
Court initially commented that the location of the body within the
judiciary would not violate separation of powers unless the powers
vested in the Commission would be more appropriately performed by
the other branches or undermine the integrity of the judiciary.178 The
Court noted that, as a general principle, executive or administrative
duties of a non-judicial nature could not be imposed on judges holding
173. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 776 (White, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381. The Court relied on its functional treatment of separation
of powers in the past and commented that the drafters of the Constitution did not require and
rejected the notion that the three branches remain entirely separate and distinct. See Nixon,
433 U.S. at 433 (rejecting as archaic the complete division of authority among the three
branches).
Prior to the conclusion reached in Mistretta explicitly authorizing extrajudicial service, the
Court had contemplated the issue of extrajudicial service very infrequently. The Mistretta
Court considered whether it was permissible for federal judges to serve on the Federal
Sentencing Commission for the purpose of creating sentencing guidelines for the federal courts.
The Commission has been described as an administrative agency composed of seven members
appointed and removable by the President. Individuals challenging the constitutionality of the
Commission made the argument that the Commission violated separation of powers by requir-
ing federal judges to perform duties outside the scope of Article III in an extrajudicial capacity.
In holding that the Constitution did not require the three branches of the federal government to
remain entirely distinct, the Court cleared the way for its declaration that extrajudicial service
was not barred by separation of powers. The Court determined that a functional approach to
separation of powers should be utilized when considering the permissible scope of extrajudicial
service and fashioned a two-part inquiry to guide this examination.
176. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680-81).
177. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986)).
178. Id. at 384-85.
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office under Article III of the Constitution. 179 The Court also recog-
nized, however, that this rule was not without exception. 80 The
Court's primary focus then became assessing the practical conse-
quences of locating the Sentencing Commission in the judicial
branch.181
In making this examination, the Court concentrated on
whether the placement of the Sentencing Commission in the judicial
branch undermined the integrity of the judiciary or expanded the
powers of the judiciary beyond constitutional bounds by uniting the
judiciary with the political or quasi-legislative power of the office of
commissioner. 8 2 Unlike the Sentencing Commission, 183 however, the
location of the office of extradition magistrate within the judiciary has
several practical consequences which mix the non-Article III power of
the extradition magistrate with the Article III power inherent in the
position of a federal judge. This, in turn, contributes to a
deterioration of the integrity of the judicial branch as a whole.
In creating the position of extradition magistrate, Congress
has essentially united a supposed non-Article III power with Article
III power for the purpose of effectuating extradition. Congress has
asked federal judges to rely on their inherent Article III authority to
interpret treaties and to apply their conclusions to the facts of the
extradition matter before them. 184 By failing to divorce the role of the
Article III judge completely from that of the extradition magistrate,
Congress has impermissibly expanded the power and authority of the
federal judiciary beyond its intended scope. 8 5 Furthermore, it ap-
179. Id. at 385 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677).
180. Id. at 386. See, for example, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (upholding a
challenge to rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934).
181. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393 C'Our separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the
labeling of an activity as 'substantative' as opposed to 'procedural' or 'political' as opposed to
judicia' .... Rather, our inquiry is focused on the 'unique aspects of the congressional plan at
issue and its practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article III.").
182. Id.
183. The Court indicated that "since substantative judgment in the field of sentencing has
been and remains appropriate to the Judicial Branch, and the methodology or rulemaking has
been and remains appropriate to that branch, Congress's considered decision to combine these
functions in an independent Sentencing Commission and to locate that Commission within the
Judicial Branch does not violate the principle of separation of powers." Id. at 396-97.
184. The extradition magistrate is required to interpret the applicable extradition treaty to
determine whether the offense is extraditable and whether the principle of dual criminality has
been satisfied. See Part III.A.2. Because treaties are considered the "Supreme Law of the
Land" according to the Constitution, the judiciary has the authority to interpret treaties that
have been ratified by the Senate whenever such treaties are relevant to a dispute before the
court. U.S. Const., Art. VI, § 2. See also United States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir.
1979) (commenting that the judiciary is responsible for interpreting treaties).
185. The Court in Mistretta reached a different conclusion: "[A]lthough the Commission is
located in the Judicial Branch, its powers are not united with the powers of the Judiciary in a
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pears that in performing the function of extradition magistrate, the
federal judge becomes accountable both to other members of the
federal judiciary and to the executive. 186
Although Mistretta and Ferreira can be relied upon to justify
the authorization of a federal judge to perform executive or adminis-
trative functions, these cases do not support the proposition that a
federal judge may perform an entirely judicial function in an
extrajudicial capacity pursuant to a grant of authority beyond the
scope of Article III. Mistretta and Ferreira permit federal judges to
perform executive functions completely separate from their
traditional functions-adjusting claims and establishing sentencing
guidelines. As an extradition magistrate, by contrast, a judge is
required to exercise judicial power pursuant to Article I and Article
II. Even the flexible, functional language of Mistretta explicitly
prohibits federal judges from wearing the executive or administrative
"hat" and the judicial "hat" simultaneously. 87  In the context of
extradition, the extradition magistrate has failed to remove the
judicial hat before donning a new one.
Service as an extradition magistrate also permits an Article III
judge to exercise a greater degree of political judgment than is ap-
propriate for a non-political branch. 8 8 This exercise of political judg-
ment can be seen in the fact that the magistrate is given discretion to
invoke the political offense exception in determining whether an
individual is extraditable. 8 9 Once the magistrate refuses to certify
way that has meaning for separation-of-powers analysis." The Court explicitly stated that the
Sentencing Commission did not exercise judicial (Article III) power. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393.
As noted, this is markedly different from the function that the extradition magistrate is ex-
pected to perform.
186. The Court in Mistretta specified that the Sentencing Commission was not controlled
by the judicial branch and subject to the President's limited powers of removal. Id. The extradi-
tion statute contemplates both executive and judicial control of the action of the extradition
magistrate in the form of review by the Secretary of State and habeas corpus review by the
judiciary.
187. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 404.
188. Compare Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396. In commenting on the impact of the Commission
on the Judiciary, the Court noted, "[n]or do the Guidelines, though substantative, involve a
degree of political authority inappropriate for a nonpolitical Branch." The Court also added,
"[the rules] do not bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public." This is not the case in
the context of extradition, as the extradition magistrate's actions authorize the executive to
surrender an individual to a foreign state to stand trial.
189. The political offense exception allows the judge determining the issue of extraditability
to refuse certification on the ground that the offense is an act directed against the security of
the state. Refusal to certify an individual as extraditable on this ground is based on the appre-
hension that the surrender of political criminals to stand trial in the courts of the accusing state
would be to subject the individual to being tried and punished by tribunals colored by political
passion. Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of
Extradition Law, 48 Va. L. Rev. 1226, 1226 (1962).
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the accused as extraditable on this ground, the determination cannot
be reviewed by the executive. It could be argued that in invoking the
political offense exception, the magistrate is making what can only be
called a political decision in situations where all other extradition
requirements have been met.190 Such political power is especially
troubling because the accountability of a non-elected, non-majori-
tarian extradition magistrate is virtually non-existent.
The location of the position of extradition magistrate in the
judiciary also eliminates accountability in another important respect.
When the Secretary of State makes a foreign policy determination,
the public should be afforded the opportunity to hold this individual
accountable. When a foreign policy determination is involved in a
decision to extradite, the Secretary of State can easily claim that the
law did not permit extradition of the accused. This could be achieved
very simply by permitting the Secretary to review the conclusions of
the extradition magistrate, whether or not such review were actually
undertaken. Such deception of the public compromises the integrity
of the judiciary, and the public is unable to hold the Secretary of State
accountable for any consequences resulting from the refusal to extra-
dite.191
In light of these considerations, the location of the position of
the extradition magistrate in the judiciary violates functional separa-
tion of powers standards set forth in Mistretta by expanding the pow-
ers of the judiciary beyond constitutional limitations. It unites the
political power of the executive branch and the non-Article III judicial
power of the extradition magistrate with the judicial power of the
Article III judge and eliminates any degree of accountability for the
Secretary of State.
ii. Service as an Extradition Magistrate
Because the location of the Sentencing Commission in
Mistretta did not violate separation of powers, the Court went on to
consider whether the composition of the Commission could also sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny. Consideration of this issue essentially
focused on whether service on the Sentencing Commission would
190. There has been a general movement to transfer the discretionary power to determine
political offenses from the extradition magistrate to the executive. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d
504, 513-18 (7th Cir. 1981).
191. Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 76.
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undermine the integrity of the judiciary.19 2 Although the Court in
Mistretta found this not to be the case, the same cannot be said of the
extrajudicial service of the extradition magistrate.
It cannot be disputed that the judicial power of the federal
courts extends only to the adjudication of cases and controversies.
Equally beyond debate is the consideration that the federal courts
should carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly
judicial in its character and derived from Article III of the
Constitution. 193 These considerations are based on the fact that the
judiciary relies on the reputation of its members as a means to pro-
mote its effectiveness.19 This effectiveness is seriously jeopardized by
the required performance of duties as extradition magistrates. 1 5
The prospect of executive review challenges the integrity of the
judiciary. The blending of Article III functions with the non-Article
III judicial functions contemplated by the extradition statute makes it
difficult to discern when the judge is acting as an extradition magis-
trate and when the judge is acting as a member of an Article III court.
This inability to distinguish the actions of the judge is expressly
contemplated and rejected by Mistretta's "two hat" analogy. The
judiciary's dependence upon the moral force of its judgments is sub-
stantially undercut if the public perceives that these judgments are
not given full credit by other branches of the government even if the
judge is acting in an extrajudicial capacity. Furthermore, the judici-
ary's involvement in the process of making a foreign policy determina-
tion weakens public confidence in the disinterestedness of the judici-
ary.19 6
Therefore, both the location of the office of extradition magis-
trate in the judicial branch and the requirement that federal judges
serve in an extrajudicial capacity offend the principle of separation of
192. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 668-74. The Court first stated that the concept of extrajudicial
service was not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. In reaching this determination, the
Court compared the incompatibility clause found in Art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (prohibiting extra-legislative
service by members of Congress) with the lack of such a clause in Article III. Second, the Court
identified numerous examples of extrajudicial service throughout the judicial history as
evidence that such practice is not prohibited by the Constitution. Finally, the Court cited the
fact that the judges would be acting individually and not as courts. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at
397-408.
193. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 355.
194. Rushford, 485 F. Supp. at 479.
195. The Court in Mistretta emphasized the voluntary nature of federal judges' service on
the Federal Sentencing Commission. 488 U.S. at 405-06. Service as an extradition magistrate
appears to be mandatory according to the text of the statute governing the procedure. See 18
U.S.C. § 3184.
196. See Felix Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, in 1 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 475,
478 (1930).
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powers. For these reasons, the current U.S. extradition procedure is
unconstitutional according to a functional analysis.
2. Assessing the Functional Analysis
As a general principle, extreme caution should be utilized in
attempting to justify an expansion of the duties of an Article III judge
in a extrajudicial capacity, even under a functional analysis. In the
context of extradition, Congress has created a system which elimi-
nates the potential for appellate review and accountability by describ-
ing the actions taken by a federal judge as extrajudicial. This not only
undermines the integrity of the judiciary, but also forces members of
the judiciary to consider purely political matters. The prospect of
review of a judge's extraditability determination relegates the
judiciary to the status of a political pawn enabling the Secretary of
State to sacrifice the integrity of the judiciary to mask an
underhanded political decision.197
The inherent strength of a functional approach to separation of
powers is the ability to allow the government to create unique an-
swers to unique problems. Instead of developing a pragmatic solution
to the unique problem of extradition, however, Congress has
essentially compromised the constitutional principle of separation of
powers.
C. Rethinking Extradition: Thoughts on a Constitutional Solution
The act of surrendering an individual to a foreign state pursu-
ant to an extradition treaty is a purely executive function. This must
continue to be the overarching concern of any reconsideration of the
extradition statute. No statute should bind the Secretary of State to
deliver an individual to a requesting state simply because an indi-
vidual is certified as extraditable. However, the statute should
balance the competing concerns of separation of powers, individual
liberty, and United States foreign policy. Achieving this end requires
contemplation of a fundamental recharacterization of the roles played
by each of the branches. A comparative valuation of the competing
desires-final executive authority in determining whether to surren-
197. See Abbell and Ristau, International Judicial Assistance § 13-3-8 at 260 (cited in note
46). The authors indicate that "on only two occasions since 1950 has the Secretary refused to
issue a warrant for the surrender of a person found extraditable. In each of those instances, he
based his refusal on a disagreement with the courts as to whether the treaty permitted
extradition, not on his discretionary power to deny extradition for unspecified reasons." In both
of these cases, denial based on review was perceived to be a cover for policy-driven motives.
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der an individual to the requesting nation and involvement of the
judiciary in determining extraditability-is necessary in order to
fashion a workable result.
1. Scenario 1: Vesting Article III Courts With Jurisdiction Over
Extradition
It can be argued that the extradition statute enacted in 1848
vested jurisdiction in the federal courts and not in the judges and
justices individually. Because this statute was enacted prior to the
grant of general federal question jurisdiction in 1875,198 it was neces-
sarily a specific grant of jurisdiction. 199 Cases decided in other con-
texts have expressly interpreted such grants of jurisdiction as ex-
tending to courts and not to judges individually. 200 The manner in
which federal judges handle extradition matters is consistent with
this interpretation as well. The dockets and federal courtrooms of the
federal judicial system are specifically utilized to conduct extradition
hearings. 201
Recognizing a jurisdictional grant of authority conferred on
federal courts to hear extradition matters contemplates a complete
severance of the judicial and executive roles. Extradition matters
should proceed through the court's civil docket and require the re-
questing state to establish by a certain level of evidence that the
accused committed the alleged crime. The standard of proof should
reflect the lower level of proof traditionally required in extradition
matters while affording the accused sufficient protection and due
process before he or she is removed from the United States to stand
trial before a foreign tribunal without any guarantee of the safe-
guards found within the United States legal system. Additionally, the
complete appellate process should be available to the accused, includ-
ing direct and collateral review, with res judicata attaching to the
final extraditability determinations.
Executive discretion in determining whether to extradite the
accused should be limited in only one regard-the Secretary of State
198. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470. This Act granted federal courts jurisdiction over
cases arising under the Constitution, treaties, and federal law.
199. The original statute mandated that extradition judges were "hereby severally vested
with power, jurisdiction, and authority" over extradition matters. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167,
9 Stat. 302, 302.
200. See In re United States, 194 U.S. 194, 196 (1904); Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186
U.S. 193 (1902).
201. Compare Ferreira, 54 U.S. at 51 (indicating that extrajudicial matters can neither
"remain in the District Court, nor.., be recorded there").
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should not be allowed to refuse surrender upon proper reconsideration
of the case before the Article III court. This would not handcuff the
Secretary in terms of refusing surrender because of the vast number
of reasons available to the Secretary beyond review of the judge's
determination.2 02
If this scheme were adopted, the liberty interest in having a
judicial presence involved in the extradition process would be satis-
fied. Further, very little control over the extradition process would be
sacrificed by the executive.
2. Scenario 2: Vesting Administrative Agencies With Authority To
Hear Extradition Matters
As an alternative, the power of the executive could be best
maximized and best served if the authority to determine the issue of
extraditability were vested in an administrative agency within the
Department of State. Full administrative hearings could be con-
ducted before the agency and extraditability could be determined by
an adminstrative law judge. The competing, though essentially sub-
ordinate, need for judicial involvement in the process would then be
satisfied by the process of habeas corpus review. In this respect, the
prospect of executive review would be eviscerated, as the determina-
tion of extraditability would emanate from an adjudicatory determi-
nation within the executive branch. In today's administrative-ori-
ented society, such a scenario would hardly be considered an anomaly.
Moreover, the prospect of extrajudicial service would be eliminated, as
the judiciary would be restricted to serving in its traditional capacity.
V. CONCLUSION
The current United States extradition statute is not exactly a
model of clarity. Examination of the process demonstrates that
Congress's attempt to appease the interests of both the judiciary and
the executive has resulted in a violation of separation of powers,
whether one relies upon a formal or functional analysis. Although the
prospect of executive review can inure only to the benefit of the
202. See Part III.B.2.
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individual awaiting extradition, the broader implications of such
review, when combined with the realities of extrajudicial service,
result in a process that cannot withstand separation of powers scru-
tiny.
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